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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
Elections and democratization are nothing new as research topics in the field of political 
science, and neither is political violence a neglected subject among sociologists, yet their 
convergence—electoral violence and its implications to the democratization process—has 
received much less attention from academics, perhaps because large scale political 
violence is commonly associated with autocratic regimes, whereas the emergence of 
regular multi-party elections is commonly thought of as an indication of successful regime 
transition and democratization. For the past two decades, Africa has been amid a wave of 
democratization, but in recent years it has become more apparent that the transition may 
not necessarily follow along the traditional trajectory of modernization theories. After a 
multitude of competitive electoral cycles, elections in Africa still often feature many non-
democratic elements—electoral violence included. But is the prevalence of electoral 
violence in Africa an indication of a setback in the democratization process?  
The aim of this research is three-fold: (1) to understand the role of elections in shaping the 
hybrid regimes of Africa, (2) to explore the dynamics of the political struggle between (and 
within) the incumbents and the opposition in these hybrid regimes, and (3) to analyze the 
influence of popular perception of the electoral struggle and its outcomes. 
The main research question is  
Under what conditions are elections in Africa at high risk of being marred with 
electoral violence?  
I will argue that several contributing factors can be identified that may increase the risk of 
electoral violence in Africa’s non-consolidated democracies. Among them are  
 a diminishing popularity of the ruling party,  
 a democratic deficit,  
 limited/blocked opportunities for (moderate) election fraud or  
 an excessively blatant and unveiled attempt of electoral manipulation,  
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 unresolved ethnic grievances,  
 internal splits within the main political rival parties, and 
 an inconclusive constitutional reform prior to the elections 
The secondary research question is  
How do unfair/violent elections affect popular democratic aspirations in Africa’s 
electoral authoritarian regimes? 
I will argue that while several consecutive unfair and/or violent elections may have a 
negative impact on popular democratic aspirations, individual failed elections do not seem 
to decrease democratic demand in any noticeable way. However, the perceived democratic 
supply is likely to increase as a consequence of unfair/violent elections, which will 
increase the democratic deficit in these countries, potentially adding pressure for demands 
of democratic reform. Unfair and violent elections are also highly likely to decrease the 
popularity of the ruling party if they are perceived to be responsible of the electoral 
irregularities, increasing the likelihood of a regime change in the long run.  
1.2 THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 
In the year 2011, multiparty elections were scheduled to be held in 27 of the 54 
independent states in Africa1 —an indication that this has become a regular and common 
practice on a continent where military dictatorships and one-party systems had been the 
norm until the late 1980s. Before the end of the Cold War, a clear majority of African 
states were ruled by non-democratic regimes and less than one out of five African 
countries were holding regular competitive elections. Autocratic leaders were able to 
suppress democratic demands and continue receiving financial support from one of the two 
camps of the Cold War—either from the US or the Soviet Union—and again turn that 
support into patronage for buying domestic support or more effective repression of the 
opposition. Democratic demands were too weak or undeveloped to generate any kind of 
significant political pressure to push the incumbents into political concessions, and with a 
lack of international scrutiny, they could easily be suppressed by the ruling autocratic elite.  
                                                             
1
 South Sudan joined the family of independent African states on 9 July 2011 as the 54
th 
sovereign country 
in Africa 
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A number of reformist/democratic movements emerged in Africa in the 1980s in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis (Bratton & Van de Walle 1992: 429–432). A collapsing 
economy caused dissatisfaction with autocratic governments, because they were held 
responsible for the economic hardships. Declining state revenues also reduced the moneys 
available for patronage and repression, thus improving the opposition’s chances for 
challenging the incumbents. The end of the Cold War gave a major boost to the democratic 
movement in Africa. At the same time international financial support, especially from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became more conditional. This 
meant that autocratic governments no longer had easy access to foreign support unless they 
made democratic concessions. 
By the end of the Cold War foreign money flows to autocratic leaders shrank considerably 
as the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the Western block no longer needed to provide 
incentives to autocratic regimes in order to keep them from defecting into the Communist 
camp. The wave of democratization in late 1980s and early 1990s in many countries that 
had belonged to the Communist camp sparked a similar development in various parts of 
Africa, increasing internal pressure on autocratic regimes to open up and conduct political 
reforms. These internal democratic demands were reinforced by international pressure on 
autocratic African rulers to democratize in exchange for continued Western funding. The 
whole political climate among western donors started to shift from a development focused 
mind-set towards a democracy and human-rights paradigm.  
Several scholars have associated the democratization wave in Africa with Samuel 
Huntington’s (1991) Third Wave of Democratization that, according to Huntington, started 
with the Carnation Revolution of Portugal in 1974 and continued with the democratic 
transitions in Latin America during the 1980s and in Eastern Europe after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  The first wave, according to Huntington (1991: 15–18), began in the 
early 19th century, having had its roots in the American and French Revolutions, and lasted 
until 1922 when Mussolini rose to power in Italy. The second wave began with the Allied 
victory in World War II and lasted until early the 1960s when a clear majority of the newly 
independent countries in Africa fell under an authoritarian regime (Huntington 1991: 18–
20). It was not until after the fall of the Soviet bloc that the third wave of democratization 
finally started to sweep over Africa in full strength. 
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More multiparty elections were held in Africa during the 1990s than ever before. Over 180 
legislative and executive (presidential) multiparty elections were arranged during this 
decade. Between 1945 and 1990 there had only been a total of 151 multiparty elections in 
Africa. In almost half of the countries multiparty elections were now arranged for the first 
time since founding elections. (Hyde & Marinov 2012.) By the end of 2000, the number of 
countries holding regular multi-party elections had quadrupled compared to the Cold War 
era (Van de Walle, 2002: 67). However, in almost 80 percent of the cases the incumbent 
party remained in power by winning these elections, and nearly two thirds of these 
elections were considered not to have been free and fair. It soon became clear that although 
there were more regular multiparty elections in Africa than ever before, a majority of these 
elections did not quite live up to democratic standards.  
Faced with increasing internal and external demands for democratization, the autocratic 
African rulers were forced between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, giving in to 
democratic demands and arranging free and fair multiparty elections was likely to get them 
displaced from power. On the other hand, attempts to suppress these demands could lead to 
financial sanctions which together with growing domestic discontent could make them 
vulnerable to coups and popular uprisings. Some of the autocrats were convinced that they 
enjoyed popular support and thought they could win their elections in a fair game, only to 
find themselves experiencing a bitter loss against their political opponents. Others soon 
learned from the mistakes of their colleagues and managed to turn the odds to their favor 
via skilful manipulation of elections they chose to enter into. Many did not even need to 
resort to dirty tricks in order to secure their victory due to the lack of any serious political 
competition from a weak and fragmented opposition.   
Staffan Lindberg (2007) has done extensive research on the democratizing effect of 
elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has gathered data from 284 African elections between 
1989 and 2006. Lindberg’s data set shows that the first round of 118 multiparty elections 
during the 1990s in countries that had previously abstained from running elections, 50 
elections were considered to have been flawed, and from the remaining 68 election that 
were considered to have been free and fair, only 26 per cent resulted in regime transition 
(Lindberg 2007: 38–40). Thus, regardless of consecutive rounds of multiparty elections, 
several autocratic rulers managed to maintain a steady grip to power.  
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Electoral violence is but one of the many illicit tactics available for both incumbent and 
opposition politicians alike in order to influence the election outcome. However, in conflict 
research literature it is generally considered a strategy of the weak, since the powerful 
usually have other and more sophisticated means for dictating results of the electoral 
process. These (often) illicit tactics include vote buying, banning of political rivals from 
the race, monopolizing media and state resources, violent intimidation of political rivals 
and/or their supporters, as well as conducting outright fraud (Cyllah 2010: 5).  
1.3 WHAT IS ELECTORAL VIOLENCE? 
According to Jeff Fischer (2002), the author of the IFES2 White Paper on Electoral 
Conflict and Violence,  
[e]lectoral conflict and violence can be defined as any random or organized act that 
seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, 
verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced 
“protection,” blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination  (Fischer 2002: 8) 
Isaac O. Albert (2007), professor of African History and Peace Studies at the University of 
Ibadan, defines electoral violence as 
[a]ll forms of organized acts or threats — physical, psychological, and structural — 
aimed at intimidating, harming, [or] blackmailing a political stakeholder before, 
during and after an election with a view of determining, delaying, or otherwise 
influencing an electoral process (Albert 2007: 133)  
What set Albert’s definition apart from Fischer’s is that he does not consider “random 
acts” to constitute electoral violence. Although in this thesis I will mainly focus on 
organized electoral violence as a tactic used by political contenders to influence the 
outcome of the electoral process, I do acknowledge that elections can also trigger random 
or spontaneous acts of violence among various stakeholders, particularly during the post-
election phase. However, I would tend to assume that the random acts of electoral violence 
                                                             
2 International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
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will follow a somewhat different logic than organized does electoral violence, and 
therefore I would consider it to fall beyond the scope of this research. 
Perpetrators of electoral violence 
Potential perpetrators of electoral violence can be divided into the following categories: 
 The military 
 The police force 
 Private security forces, paramilitary/rebel groups 
 Criminal gangs, cults, hired “thugs” 
 Hardcore supporters of the political parties 
Although not exhaustive, this list provides a good starting point for understanding the 
nature of the people that are involved in electoral violence and their motives. Because 
electoral violence is by nature politically motivated, the perpetrators are, in most cases, 
likely to be linked to party politics in one way or another. More often than not, electoral 
violence is directly orchestrated by one or more of the political parties involved, or it 
occurs with its/their assent. Thus, political parties, both those in power and those in the 
opposition, have a pivotal role in the emergence and continued occurrence of electoral 
violence. However, politicians do not always have full control over the perpetrators of 
political violence (listed above), even when they operate under the direct payroll of the 
politicians. Sometimes things get out of the politicians’ hands and escalate. However, the 
more organized and trained the perpetrators are, the less likely they are to disobey the 
orders issued by a political authority. 
Kristine Höglund (2010), an associate professor of Peace and Conflict Research at the 
University of Uppsala, has studied the links between political leadership and electoral 
violence. She argues that political leaders are, in most cases, key instigators of electoral 
violence and explains how their political leadership serves two main functions in the 
emergence of electoral violence. First, political leaders motivate electoral violence through 
framing, i.e. socially constructing certain identities for and images of supporters and rivals 
of the party that are often bipolar (“us” vs. “them”) e.g. through militant rhetorics and hate 
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speech. The more exclusive the rhetoric and the constructed identity, the more likely it is to 
motivate acts of violence. The second function is implementing, which refers to the process 
of mobilizing perpetrators from deeds to acts in carrying out the actual violence. This 
includes creating concrete and selective incentives for those involved in carrying out the 
violence. According to Höglund, such incentives are often channelled in the form of 
patronage, e.g. cash payments, provisions of food, alcohol and drugs, or in the form of 
longer-term incentives such as expectations of getting employment for family members, 
gaining powerful positions or state contracts for various jobs etc. (Höglund 2010.) 
Having better access to state resources provides incumbent politicians with an advantage 
over their opposition counterparts in that they can use these resources to create incentives 
for potential perpetrators of electoral violence and to mobilize them in order to advance 
their own political aims. Access to national resources may be subject to legal constraints, 
and the degree to which these constraints are followed might be determined by corruption, 
lack of transparency, etc. This leads us to the conclusion that the ability of a politician to 
orchestrate electoral violence against his/her political rivals or the voters en masse 
depends, to a large extent, on his/her ability to motivate and provide incentives (i.e. 
patronage) for potential perpetrators who would then get involved in the electoral violence. 
However, politicians are not the only sponsors of electoral violence. For example, Human 
Rights Watch (2007a) accuses “political godfathers”, i.e. wealthy and powerful individuals 
with political interests, of sponsoring and arranging campaigns of electoral violence on 
behalf of the less-resourceful politicians, in exchange for financial returns and political 
favors once the politicians have gained office (HRW 2007a: 6–7). Höglund also notes that 
non-constituted leaders—people with no formal (political) leadership positions but 
nevertheless having power and influence over specific processes—often have more room 
to maneuver than do top-level politicians with highly-visible roles in the society, and they 
can wield their influence more broadly than grassroots level leaders due to their resources 
and connections (Höglund 2007: 9). Religious leaders and influential businessmen are 
included in this category as well.  
Victims 
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Victims of electoral violence can usually be divided into three categories: 
 Political rivals and their election campaigners 
 Potential supporters and voters of political rivals 
 Election officials 
Political rivals are often the most direct targets of electoral violence during the pre-election 
phase. After all, one of the most reliable ways to win an election is to knock other 
contenders out of the race. The incumbents usually tend to focus their intimidation efforts 
primarily on rival politicians rather than on other potential victim groups, since they often 
have other means for influencing election officials, and they often do not want to 
intimidate voters (unless absolutely necessary) in order to make the elections appear more 
legitimate in the eyes of the general populace. Political rivals do not necessarily have to 
come from the opposition, but they can also be fellow party members, i.e. people within 
the ruling party. For example in Nigeria, intra-party violence during the primaries of the 
2007 gubernatorial, general and presidential elections was particularly fierce, causing 
several casualties (HRW 2007a). Intimidating or assaulting political rivals directly may 
have more straightforward implications than targeting their voters, firstly because it might 
be difficult to identify these potential voters of the rival candidates, and secondly, because 
targeting them could result in loss of votes from the swing voters that would otherwise 
give their vote to the potential offender. On the other hand, intimidating political rivals 
may cause them to retaliate, thus compromising the offender’s own safety. Therefore, voter 
intimidation tends to be a safer route for devious politicians, and thus they might prefer to 
utilize electoral violence against voters rather than other politicians. This would mean 
taking fewer risks in terms of personal safety, although at the same time, political risks (in 
terms of popular support) might increase.  
As Paul Collier &  Pedro C. Vincente (2008) point out, voter intimidation may not be very 
effective in turning people into voting against their personal preference, mainly due to the 
fact that the ballot is cast anonymously and in secret, so it may be impossible to know for 
sure who the intimidated people actually will vote for, and in addition, the intimidated 
people might also decide not to vote at all. Although in the majority of cases people tend to 
be fairly confident about the secrecy of the ballot, Afrobarometer results show that in 
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Africa between 2008 and 2009 almost one out of four persons believed that it is somewhat 
or very likely that those in power could actually find out how they voted.  Yet, as potential 
swing voters may be difficult to identify, their voting behavior—in terms of whom they 
vote for—may likewise be difficult to control. However, if potential supporters of the 
political rival(s) can be identified, devious politicians and their thugs can relatively easily 
monitor whether these people vote or not. It may be considerably easier to repel potential 
opposition/rival voters from the ballot box than to force them to vote against their preferred 
candidate. However, voter intimidation almost always leads into a decrease in voter turnout 
which in turn reduces the perceived legitimacy of the election. In authoritarian electoral 
regimes, the whole point of running elections, from the incumbents’ point of view, is to 
legitimize the prevailing regime, i.e. the status quo. The goal is to secure an election 
victory, and at the same time to make the victory appear as legitimate as possible. 
Therefore, voter intimidation is more or less incompatible with the aims of the incumbents 
so long as there are other alternatives available for securing a victory in the elections. For 
the opposition, who often are the underdogs, undermining the legitimacy of the elections 
may be a worthwhile strategy, especially if they are likely to lose the elections anyway. So 
long as the incumbents are also playing unfair, they may even manage to turn the tide in 
popularity, should the incumbents resort to retaliation through the same violent tactics. 
1.4 ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA 
As defined by Fischer (2002) and Albert (2007), electoral violence consists of acts or 
threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated in order to influence the 
electoral process or its outcome. What makes electoral violence stand out from other illicit 
tactics used by devious politicians, such as vote buying, is its non-political nature as it 
relies on coercive means rather than on persuasion. Electoral fraud relies on neither but 
makes use of the non-transparent element of elections, namely the secrecy of the ballot, so 
that the results can be manipulated. Yet, while being the ultimate form of engineering the 
desired election result—as it might virtually always guarantee a favorable result for the 
manipulator—it also carries the danger of compromising the sole purpose for which the 
autocratic elites signed up for the elections in the first place—namely to legitimize the 
continuation of their rule. Thus, it is often less likely to bring high legitimacy gains 
compared to other tactics. But if the party cannot otherwise secure enough votes to win the 
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election—and losing is not an option they are willing to accept—then they may have no 
other choice than to resort to election fraud.  
Electoral violence has increased by 50 percent in Africa from 1990 to 2006 compared to 
the time between 1945 and 1989 (Hyde & Marinov 2012). According to the NELDA3 
dataset of national elections, ranging from 1945 to 2006, between 1945 and 1989 there 
were 352 election events, of which 66 or 18.75 percent were marred with electoral violence 
that involved civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election. Between 
1990 and 2006 there were a total of 330 election events of which 93 (or 28.18 percent) 
involved electoral violence. (Hyde & Marinov 2012.) 
Stakes 
The incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes usually have strong incentives for 
staying in power, but due to internal and/or external pressure for democratization they are 
forced to expose themselves to the uncertainties of elections. However, long years of 
autocratic rule may leave behind a legacy of deep-rooted cleavages and tensions within the 
society that may turn against the incumbents in the face of a regime change should they 
lose the elections. Losing would not only mean a loss of political power but also a loss of 
legal impunity as well as the loss of financial/material benefits the incumbency has 
provided. Sometimes a regime change can even lead to the death of a former autocrat 
despite any possible concessions he/she has made during his/her final years in power. From 
the opposition’s point of view there is often much more to win than to lose in the elections 
since losing would most often just mean the continuation of business-as-usual whereas 
winning would promise tremendous changes and thus opportunities for both the opposition 
politicians and their constituencies.   
Competitiveness 
As the opposition strengthens and is allowed to operate more freely, the competition 
between the incumbents and the opposition is likely to increase. High levels of competition 
                                                             
3 National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy, a dataset of all national elections (both 
executive/presidential and legislative/parliamentary) held in independent states that have a population 
greater than 500’000 between 1945 and 2006. The dataset is upheld by Yale University. 
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mean that even small shifts in the share of votes can determine who will be the winning 
party. Thus, the contenders are likely to use any means available to boost their share of 
votes. When the stakes are high and competition stirs up, it may become increasingly 
tempting to resort to illicit tactics to win the electoral race. High stakes and 
competitiveness reinforce the political culture of winner-take-all that is usually associated 
with plurality/majority electoral systems that operate under the principle of first-past-the-
post (FPTP)4. In Africa some 28 countries use the plurality/majority system in elections 
whereas proportional representation system is used by 15 countries (Atoubi 2008: 13). 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM — THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 In recent years there has been a lively debate among scholars of contemporary African 
politics on whether the trend of not-fully-democratic elections in former autocratic African 
regimes is simply a transition phase that will eventually lead into full democratization of 
Africa or whether it indicates the birth of a new form of regime; a hybrid regime that 
incorporates democratic elements into (semi-)autocratic rule. These are what Andreas 
Schedler (2010b), one of the leading scholars in contemporary political research on 
electoral democracy and authoritarianism, among others has called electoral authoritarian 
regimes. Schedler defines electoral authoritarian regimes as regimes which conduct regular 
multiparty elections at all levels of government yet violate basic democratic standards in 
serious and systematic ways (Schedler 2010b: 69). On the surface, these systems have 
many of the characteristics of consolidated democracies: from constitutions to agencies of 
accountability and from independent media to regular multiparty elections. Yet they are 
ruled by authoritarian elites who remain in power through skilful means of manipulation 
and coercion. Although some of these hybrid regimes have in fact turned into relatively 
well functioning electoral democracies (Ghana being a prime example), most still stand a 
long way from becoming fully consolidated democracies. 
                                                             
4
 First-past-the-post means that the candidate with the greatest tally of votes will be elected and the 
candidates behind him/her will get no representation at all, regardless of their share of votes. 
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Another key debate deals with the question of what role elections play in a regime 
transition/reproduction process. Do regular multiparty elections have a genuine 
democratizing effect on (semi-)autocratic regimes or do they simply work as a vehicle for 
consolidating autocratic rule under a new “democratic” disguise? Staffan Lindberg is one 
of the main proponents of the idea that regular multiparty elections (even rigged ones) can 
indeed have a democratizing effect on the regime in the long run although in the short run 
it may seem that unfair elections are only harmful to democratic aspirations. To back his 
claim, Lindberg has gathered extensive statistics on African elections, showing that after 
each consecutive cycle of elections more countries are turning from (electoral) autocracy 
into electoral democracy (Lindberg 2007). However, he also admits that elections may in 
some cases actually sustain autocratic rule rather than reverse it.  If elections work as a tool 
for autocratic elite to legitimize their rule and keep them in power, then it is likely to lead 
to regime reproduction (keeping the regime autocratic) rather than democratization. 
Having a democratic appearance on the outset may help autocratic regimes by decreasing 
external pressure towards democratization and even generate international support that will 
strengthen the regime against the opposition and help it suppress internal democratic 
demands. On the other hand, if an autocratic regime is unable to convince the international 
community of the freeness and fairness of their elections or to muster enough domestic 
political support to actually beat the opposition, it will have to consider the option of 
making concessions or handing over some (or all) of the political power to the opposition. 
Concessions (or toleration) often come with demands that may be extremely hard to 
swallow for the incumbents. In addition to diminishing the control of political power, it 
may also lead to a loss of economic benefits or legal impunity and sometimes even 
physical insecurity (Schedler 2010a: 6–7). If the incumbent elite is not ready to pay the 
costs of toleration it is likely to use all means necessary to stay in power. As any state 
power at the end of the day resorts to the threat of (monopolized) violence, when all else 
fails, (political/electoral) violence may turn out to be the only viable strategy for autocratic 
rulers so that they can stay in power amidst growing democratic demands.  
Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vincent (2012) see electoral violence and political intimidation, 
along with vote buying and election fraud, as the main illicit strategies used by the 
incumbents so that they can hang on to power in electoral authoritarian regimes. Vote 
buying is politically the least risky illicit strategy, although it is also often the least 
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effective one. It relies on co-opting “soft” (non-hardcore) opposition supporters into 
backing the incumbents through an extended system of patronage. Incumbents most often 
have a direct access to state resources, which they can distribute to citizens in exchange for 
political support. Opposition parties rarely have access to financial resources that could in 
any way compete with the incumbents in vote buying efforts. The main problem with vote 
buying is that its effectiveness is often hard to measure or verify. As the ballot is cast in 
secret, vote buyers have little chances of knowing whether their vote buying effort actually 
had any significant effect on the voting behavior of the masses. Although not mentioned by 
Collier & Vincente, media manipulation, e.g. restricting the freedom of the press, is 
another illicit election strategy widely used by the autocratic incumbents around the world.  
Electoral fraud, on the other hand, is much more effective in guaranteeing favorable 
election results for the incumbents. If the incumbents have a sufficient control over the 
national electoral commission, vote rigging is guaranteed to work almost all the time. 
However, with growing international pressure that forces incumbents to allow external 
election observation missions to monitor contested elections, it is increasingly difficult to 
pull off electoral manipulation schemes without getting caught. Vote rigging carries much 
higher political risks than vote buying. If exposed, it might trigger fierce protests among 
the opposition in addition to international sanctions and cuts to financial support etc.  
In his famous book Polyarchy (1971), Robert A. Dahl notes that the likelihood of 
democratization in a non-democratic country depends very much on the absorption of 
certain crucial beliefs among the politically active populace (especially among the 
opposition). One of these crucial political beliefs is the support for democracy and its 
institutions (in an ideological sense) meaning that democracy is considered the most 
preferable form of government and elections the most preferable mode of selecting leaders 
(Dahl 1971: 129–140). Also, attitudes towards political authority are likely to matter: is the 
government considered to be like “a parent”, and the people to be like “children”, or is the 
government seen merely as “an employee” that is working for the people.  
Other crucial beliefs concern the effectiveness of the current regime, mutual trust within 
the society, and attitudes towards political competition and co-operation: Is the government 
perceived to be doing a good job? How much do people trust their fellow citizens? Are 
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political parties expected to compete with each other under all circumstances or should 
they focus on co-operation instead? According to Dahl, politically too competitive 
societies may easily get stuck in winner-takes-all politics that raises the costs of toleration 
for the incumbents. On the other hand, strictly pro-cooperative societies discourage 
political competition and may easily end up as one-party states. Dahl argues that some (but 
not an excessive) amount of political competition is necessary for democracy to function 
properly (Dahl 1971: 160). 
Furthermore, Dahl pays attention to how political beliefs/ideas are acquired and how these 
ideas are stacked up against competing ideas and previously held beliefs as well as 
personal experiences (Dahl 1971: 184–185). Dahl also talks about a period of receptivity 
(usually associated with young age), during which an individual is particularly receptive to 
new (political) beliefs. After this period, one’s world view and political beliefs become 
crystallized and are likely to remain rather stable (Dahl 1971: 167). Changes may occur 
later, but they are often very gradual or associated with some kind of a crisis concerning 
previously held beliefs (e.g. loss of belief). 
2.2 LINDBERG’S THEORY OF ELECTIONS AS A MODE OF TRANSITION 
Rather than marking a failure in the democratization process, electoral violence may 
simply indicate another phase in this process. Most electoral violence occurs in countries 
that may be considered as not fully democratic. However, most of these countries have 
taken at least some steps towards adopting a democratic dispensation. The fact that multi-
party elections are being held in countries that rarely held any elections until the 1990s is a 
case in point, although elections alone do not make a country democratic. Elections, 
however, are considered a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) precondition for a 
consolidated democracy.  
There has been some academic debate on whether or not democratization increases the risk 
of political violence. By democratization, in this context, I mean any moves, both 
deliberate and unintentional, toward turning the regime into a more democratic one—even 
if these moves might not necessarily result in the process making it all the way. 
Democratization is driven by democratic reforms, and these are most likely to follow after 
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multiparty elections leading to a change in power. That reformers should be hardcore 
democrats by nature is not a necessary prerequisite of democratization. The main motive of 
the reformers may simply be to change the existing regime and to unseat the incumbent 
government. What matters, for the struggle to become one of democratization, is whether 
the reformers speak and act in such a way as to strive for democracy, regardless of their 
possible hidden agendas (Lindberg 2009a: 319).  
Staffan Lindberg (2009a) presents a theory of elections as a mode of transition, arguing 
that elections can act as a vehicle for either democratization or regime reproduction or 
sometimes even for autocratization5. In this game-theoretical model, Lindberg regards 
elections in less-than-democratic countries as a subgame to a struggle for regime change he 
calls the metagame. According to Lindberg “the metagame is about the question of regime 
change, meaning changing the rules of how political power is distributed and exercised” 
(2009: 318). The “players” of this metagame are the ruling elite (often authoritarian and 
anti-democratic) and the reformers (often pro-democracy, sometimes simply anti-
government). The reformers challenge the incumbent government/elite with demands for 
democratic reforms. As a consequence, the incumbents may feel threatened by these 
demands and might view their objectives being better served by regime reproduction or 
even autocratization. Being faced with demands for a reform, the incumbent government 
has two main strategies to choose from: either (1) to suppress the demands through 
oppression or (2) to make concessions through toleration. Both of these strategies have 
their costs and benefits which I will now discuss in more detail below.  
The costs of oppression can be manifold: declining popular domestic or international 
support, sanctions, increasing financial costs of upholding patronage/clientelism or 
difficulties in maintaining the support of the military/security forces and the judiciary etc. 
The main benefit of using oppression is, of course, staying in power. Other possible 
benefits include having access to state resources, avoiding facing charges for human rights 
violations, etc. Lindberg fails to give a clear definition of what exactly is meant by 
“oppression” in his notion of the costs of oppression. Here, Collier & Vincente’s (2011) 
                                                             
5
 Autocratization means, by definition, the reverse of democratization. It refers to any steps taken towards 
the other end of the democracy–autocracy scale, as opposed to democratization. Autocratization implies a 
process of centralizing or monopolizing state power into the hands of a selected group of people, or a 
process of democratic reversal or the denial of a democratizing regime’s existence. 
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model of the three illicit electoral tactics becomes helpful as the oppression in this context 
may be considered to include not only electoral violence and intimidation but also electoral 
fraud and the misuse of state power and resources for personal political gains (e.g. through 
vote buying or media manipulation). The costs for toleration, on the one hand, may include 
a loss of power, wealth, status, protection etc. Sometimes toleration may even lead to the 
death of the dictator or his near circle. This may also be the case with too much oppression 
should it fail to keep the incumbent in power as we have seen with the case of Muammar 
Gaddafi in Libya. On the other hand, toleration in the form of concessions may bring 
popular support to the incumbents and sometimes help to compensate for the payload of 
past oppression. According to political theorist Robert A. Dahl, “the more the costs of 
suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime” 
(Dahl 1971: 15).  
In his theory, Lindberg argues that as the costs of oppression continue to grow beyond a 
point deemed acceptable by the incumbent government, one expects liberalization to occur 
in the form of increased competition. Also, as the costs of toleration decrease so that they 
become acceptable to the ruling elite, political participation is expected to become less 
restricted. Yet in reality, the situation may often be far more complex. First, what counts as 
“acceptable costs” are for the most part subjective to the people in question. What some 
might consider acceptable may be unacceptable to others. For example, Kenneth Kaunda, a 
long-ruling autocrat of Zambia, yielded to the democratic pressure and allowed multi-party 
elections in Zambia in 1991 and agreed to step down after losing the elections to an 
opposition candidate, considering the costs of toleration as acceptable, whereas Laurent 
Gbagbo, the incumbent president of Côte d’Ivoire from 2000 until 2011, refused to accept 
the result of the vote count in the 2010 presidential election, clinging onto power until he 
was forcibly removed by the northern rebels in April 2011. Second, it has been noted that 
some measure of change may be required in both the perceived costs of oppression and 
costs of toleration for regime transition to occur, although not necessarily in equal 
amounts. For example, a ruling elite facing increasing costs of oppression would be 
expected to liberalize, but due to extremely high costs of toleration (for example leading to 
the death of the dictator) the liberalization is unlikely to happen. On the other hand, if the 
costs of toleration go down, the incumbents should be able to afford more political liberties 
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to the opposition, but if the costs of oppression, at the same time, remain low, they may not 
feel the need to choose this path. (Lindberg 2009a: 320–321). 
In most cases neither the ruling elite nor the opposition should be seen as homogenous 
entities, but rather as coalitions (loose or firm) of factions united by mutual interests in the 
metagame of regime change/reproduction. The incumbent elite may include a varying 
combination of hard- and soft-liners and/or other factions. The opposition may also 
comprise of several different parties (including both democracy activists and “crooks”) 
with varying objectives, brought together sometimes by nothing more than a joint wish to 
unseat the incumbent elite. Internal splits within either camp may prove significant for the 
outcome of the metagame. A conflict between the hard-liners and soft-liners within the 
ruling elite may lead to a stall in or reverse of the liberalization process, should the hard-
liners gain the upper hand; or it may open up the possibility for more concessions to the 
opposition should the soft-liners prevail. Also some of the powerful state institutions such 
as the judiciary or the military that may have previously aligned with the incumbent 
coalition may decide for the first time to exercise independence from the incumbent 
government and cause a shift in the balance of power. Defection to the ranks of the 
opposition may be a tempting strategy for some members of the ruling elite in the face of a 
perceivably inevitable regime change, as it might bring down the perceived costs of 
toleration by inspiring hopes of avoiding penalties in the post-regime change trials. In 
much the same way, a split within the opposition may lower the costs of oppression for the 
incumbents and lessen the pressure for reforms, as a fragmented opposition rarely has the 
strength to push the government into reforms. (Lindberg 2009a: 322). 
There are a number of factors that have been identified as increasing the costs of 
oppression or decreasing the costs of toleration. For example, a strong middle class with 
economic assets and independence from the state, large urban populations, a split within 
and defections from the authoritarian regime, a well organized civil society and the 
existence of strong opposition parties, as well as international attention and sanctions 
among others are factors that increase the cost of oppression (Lindberg (2009a: 329). Pacts 
between incumbents and reformers, guarantees of pardon for past human rights abuses, 
moderate opposition groups and leaders, and institutional and electoral rules that give the 
incumbent a better chance of staying in or returning to power have also been identified as 
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factors that decrease the cost of toleration. On the other hand, factors increasing the cost of 
toleration and making repression more acceptable for the ruling elite include e.g.: rent 
incomes from oil or other extractive industries, a revolutionary ideology, dispersed rural 
populations, strategic superpower involvement, and large-scale domestic economic 
ownership and investments by the ruling elite.  
The perceived costs of toleration relate mostly to the stakes involved in the elections. The 
higher the stakes the more there is to win or to lose in an election. The costs of toleration, 
in the end, come down to the costs of losing the election. Mitigating the costs of toleration 
ultimately means making a potential defeat more bearable. The costs of oppression, 
however, relate to the capacity of the opposition to compete with the incumbent. The more 
competitive the opposition the more costly means of oppression the incumbent needs to 
pull out in order to outmaneuver its opposition rivals. External factors such as international 
scrutiny may add to the cost of heavy oppression, but without a competitive opposition the 
incumbent can easily outmaneuver its political rivals without significant financial or 
political expenses. 
In addition to the fact that most of the perceived costs and benefits related to the two 
dimensions of the transition game are subjective, as discussed above, steps towards regime 
transition or reproduction may bring forward some unforeseen costs and benefits that are 
uncovered only as the process moves forward. For example, engaging in serious repression 
at one point in time may backfire later in increased costs of toleration, as members of the 
elite involved in the repression now have blood on their hands and are likely to be 
prosecuted, should the opposition later succeed in coming to power. Also, making 
significant concessions may result in more organized opposition parties, mobilizing 
significant domestic and international support, thus causing the costs of oppression to go 
up. The actors may also make miscalculations based on limited or distorted information. 
Lindberg notes that in some autocratic systems, messengers of unwelcomed news may end 
up being punished by their superiors for being stormcrows, so the subordinates may tend to 
filter the information that they send upwards. (Lindberg 2009a: 325). 
How do elections affect the metagame? According to Lindberg “multiparty elections 
change the costs of both oppression and toleration and thus are key events that affect the 
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cost-benefit analysis for the incumbent as well as for reformers” (Lindberg 2009b: 88). In 
countries that are not fully established democracies, elections do not simply (or even 
mainly) function as devices for changing the government but also as a means for changing 
the rules of the game and moving the entire regime system towards more democratic or 
more autocratic direction. Lindberg presents multiparty elections as a subgame for the 
metagame of regime transition. In addition to the two main actors, the government and the 
opposition, this subgame also has a third principal actor, namely the collective of voters 
(the electorate). As it turns out, electoral turnout and voters’ support may significantly alter 
the costs of oppression thus affecting the payoffs of alternative strategies available for both 
the opposition and the incumbent. A high turnout coupled with the voters’ support for the 
opposition would require a massive scheme of fraud and excessive use of violence to keep 
the incumbents in power. Outsiders must also be kept in the dark when using illicit tactics, 
so that the risk of adverse reactions from the international community will be reduced, but 
when possible they must also be kept hidden from the general population in order to keep 
post-electoral protests and violent opposition from emerging. On the other hand, popular 
support for the incumbent in the elections might lower the costs of oppression and in some 
cases open a road to autocratization. Yet, it might also lower the costs of toleration as the 
incumbents are now better able to dictate the terms of political concessions without being 
subject to public pressure, thus paving the way for controlled democratization on the 
incumbents’ terms. (Lindberg 2009a: 325–326). 
Lindberg argues that the link between elections and democratization is not theoretically 
tied to the freeness and fairness of elections. Attempts of election fraud, political violence 
and intimidation of voters or political opponents during elections may stimulate activism in 
the society even more than free elections would do. (Lindberg 2009a: 328.) It has been 
found that in the long run, even flawed elections have, on average, had a positive effect on 
democratization in Africa (Lindberg 2009a: 331).  
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Democratization vs. Autocratization 
According to Lindberg, the function and significance of elections in Africa has changed 
dramatically in the period after 1989. With Cold War rivalries eased off, international 
actors no longer had incentives to back up non-democratic regimes in countries with little 
strategic relevance. Instead, support for democratic reforms became more active and 
autocrats could no longer count on the support of the superpowers in exchange for their 
ideological orientation. With strategic external interests prevalent, the costs of oppression 
decrease significantly, thus making autocratization more likely, as the incumbent elite is 
able to compensate for the weakening domestic and international support from majority of 
the international community with strategic support from other international actors who do 
not see democratization as a key priority. (Lindberg 2009a: 328–320).  
Hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes seem to be not only more stable, but they also 
seem to be the type of autocratic regimes that are less likely to democratize after 
Figure 1: The two dimensions of the metagame of regime transition (Lindberg 2009: 321)  
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breakdown but instead tend to transform into other forms of non-democratic regimes. 
These regimes usually have relatively strong state structures, more centralized control of 
natural resources, clientelism and tight control of media. When the opposition is relatively 
weak, the incumbent elite may use elections for regime reproduction. A surprising finding 
by Lindberg shows that electoral manipulation is unrelated to the success of regime 
reproduction in electoral authoritarian regimes (Lindberg 2009a: 330). On the one hand, 
weak incumbents facing strong opposition may have no choice but to resort to election 
fraud in order to win the elections, but when the manipulation is too blatant, it will rarely 
go unnoticed and most often it will lead to fierce protests. On the other hand, incumbents 
in hegemonic positions (facing a weak opposition) have much better chances of winning 
elections without any kind of manipulation. According to Lindberg, “hegemonic regimes 
provide more effective means to guarantee the government in power and are thus less in 
need of blatant manipulation of elections” (ibid.). Controlling the media is also a probable 
factor behind many stable hegemonic regimes. Having rich reserves of natural resources is 
also a potential advantage for an incumbent government in lowering or compensating some 
of the costs of oppression as it lures the strategic and economic interest of other nations. 
(Lindberg 2009a: 330–332.) 
Incumbents must be careful not to engage themselves in too much repression, though, as it 
may stimulate increased vigilance and unity among the opposition and draw international 
attention and support to the opposition, thus leading to increasing costs of regime 
reproduction in the repetitive rounds of the electoral game. Another advantage in having 
direct or indirect control over the distribution of state resources is the ability to provide 
economic opportunities for other politicians willing to be co-opted. Making friends with 
the enemy through a system of patronage can lower the standing of the opposition in the 
society, thus decreasing the cost of oppression against those who cannot be bought over. 
(Lindberg 2009a: 331–332.) 
The costs of toleration in autocratization are often two-fold. On the one hand, increasing 
costs of toleration mean the incumbents have more to lose and they are less likely to hand 
over power despite high costs of oppression. On the other hand, rulers can also 
successfully minimize the costs of toleration while lingering in power. By successfully 
manipulating opposition parties’ successes and failures through a mixture of legitimate and 
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illegitimate strategies, authoritarian governments are able to handle the increasing costs of 
toleration. However, there is also a strategy available, which, if successful, would allow the 
rulers to both decrease the costs of toleration and lower the need for costly oppression by 
gradually allowing the elections to become more competitive and adapting to the new 
context by building up a strong party organization and working to improve their image by 
legitimate means, thus turning to a path that leads towards democratization. (Lindberg 
2009a: 332–334.) 
As multiparty electoral systems are put in place, they often give several state institutions 
new rights and responsibilities. This may give the military, the police and other security 
agencies as well as the courts a chance to advance their status, and likewise with individual 
careers, thus gaining prominence through pro-democratic actions. According to Lindberg 
“when courts decide to insist on their autonomy and rule against autocratic incumbents in 
election-related disputes, the parallel struggle over the nature of the regime is directly 
affected” (Lindberg 2009a: 335). Reformers may take advantage of a more complex legal 
system by challenging the incumbents on multiple fronts. Having to fight a multitude of 
legal battles naturally increase the costs of oppression. Certain institutional provisions can 
contribute to creating pro-democracy expectations among the general population, thus 
increasing the costs of oppression in the transition metagame. One such key provision is 
term limits. It prompts a built-in expectation among the incumbents and the general 
population that after a maximum of two or three or however many consecutive terms in 
office the next elections are bound to change the individual (or the party) in power for at 
least a period of time. Other measures driving up the costs of oppression or decreasing the 
costs of toleration include e.g. effective elections monitoring and parallel vote counts, 
ambitious voter registration campaigns and credible and attractive promises given to the 
incumbents to lessen their fears of losing (Lindberg 2009a: 336.) 
The metagame is not only affected by domestic factors, but incumbent governments may 
also consider and perceive increased costs of oppression as they witness what is happening 
in neighboring countries. Opposition parties are often quick to adopt successful strategies 
from their counterparts in neighboring countries, leading to similar developments across 
regions.  The media also carries a high potential for being a force for democratization in 
the metagame. It acts as one of the main channels of putting pressure on the incumbent 
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politicians for democratic demands. Elections provide media entrepreneurs a favorable 
time to test, stretch and redefine the boundaries of both political rights and civil liberties, 
and thus influence the metagame of transition. By expressing popular demands for 
democratic reforms, publicizing clues about possible splits within the ruling elite, 
providing information on the international costs of non-reform and contributing to a sense 
that the ruling elite is vulnerable, the media causes the costs of oppression to go up. 
However, for a strong autocratic elite the media may become the stooge for regime 
reproduction by being harnessed into monitoring the citizenry and reducing or 
manipulating the flow of information to the public. (Lindberg 2009a: 337–338.) 
Apart from trying to disarm the opposition through splits or manipulation, there are a 
number of strategies available for incumbent elites to decrease the costs of toleration in 
ways that contribute to the democratization process. A strategy that could keep the ruling 
elite in power despite democratization is to pursue a more cooperative route and try to gain 
legitimacy and popular support through “playing by the rules”, making it more likely for 
them to be forgiven for their past deeds. Even if the majority of the incumbent elite would 
not be willing to make any concessions and continues to play hard, there may be some 
factions that consider the costs of oppression too high or wish to lower their costs of 
toleration. For example police or military commanders may refuse to use stark force 
against opposition parties during election campaigns. Some members of the ruling elite 
may even be tempted to defect and join the opposition in anticipation of a regime change, 
adding more pressure on the ones that choose to remain with the ruling elite. Power-
sharing institutions have been found to be effective in reducing the costs of toleration for 
the incumbents, especially compared to winner-takes-all configurations. Providing 
members of the incumbent elite “ways out” and with a chance of still being important 
players in the new governing coalition is likely to bring down the costs of toleration 
considerably. (Lindberg 2009a: 338–340.) 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
While Staffan Lindberg’s theory mainly looks at things from the perspective of the 
incumbents in explaining the role of elections from the prospect of democratization in 
electoral authoritarian regimes, there seems to be no easy way of measuring the subjective 
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perception of the incumbents concerning the costs and benefits of oppression and 
toleration. However, as the electoral game always involves the voters and the anticipated 
popular voting behavior is likely affect any calculations of the electoral outcome made by 
the incumbents and the opposition, I believe it is possible to shed some light on the 
electoral strategy choices of the political competitors by studying the popular democratic 
aspirations, the party affiliations, and the political mood of the people through a series of 
surveys. Based on Lindberg’s reasoning, I would assume that a high democratic demand 
and a popular support for the opposition are likely to raise the costs of oppression for the 
incumbents.  
In order to study the popular democratic/political perceptions in the three case countries, I 
have used the Afrobarometer database and the excellent online data analysis tool that can 
be found on their website. I have analyzed the survey data from multiple survey rounds 
that have been conducted in Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe between the years 1999 and 
2009, but most of my research is based on the data from the Afrobarometer round 4 (2008–
2009), which during the writing of this study represents the most recent Afrobarometer 
data available from these case countries. Most of the research is based on a quantitative 
analysis of the survey data using inferential statistics, with survey samples providing a 
basis for assumptions concerning the general population. In the following chapter I shall 
discuss the research data in more detail. 
3 RESEARCH DATA 
3.1 AFROBAROMETER 
Afrobarometer is an independent Africa-based research project consisting of a comparative 
series of public attitude surveys in several African countries. The project is carried out by a 
joint effort of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Ghana Center for 
Democratic Development (CDD) and the Department of Political Science at the Michigan 
State University, together with a number of national partner-organizations. The first round 
of Afrobarometer surveys was carried out in twelve African countries between 1999 and 
2001. Since then, there have been a total of four rounds with a fifth one expected to be 
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completed by the end of 2012. The number of countries included in the Afrobarometer has 
by now expanded to twenty-two. The project is publicly funded and the data is freely 
available through its website (http://afrobarometer.org) to researchers, policy-makers, 
journalists and anyone interested in this project. A typical Afrobarometer questionnaire 
includes approximately 100 questions, some of which are broken into further sets of more 
detailed questions. (Afrobarometer 2012.) 
Afrobarometer utilizes a standardized set of questions in every survey round in each target 
country, making the results fully comparable across all countries included and over time. 
The questions relate to social, political and economic issues, including topics like 
democracy, governance, conflict and crime, and public participation.  Democracy-related 
questions are meant to measure popular understanding of, support for, and satisfaction with 
democracy, as well as any desire to return to, or experiment with, authoritarian modes of 
rule. Questions about governance strive to indicate public perception about, and 
satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent government in delivering social 
services to the people. The conflict and crime section includes questions that aim at finding 
out how safe people feel and what their experience with crime and violence in their society 
is. Lastly, public participation is being measured, among other things, by looking at 
people’s involvement in elections and their perceptions about the quality of the electoral 
processes. (Afrobarometer 2012.) 
3.1.1 Sampling of data 
The standard sample size in Afrobarometer surveys is ca. 1200 interviews per country per 
round. In bigger countries such as Nigeria, the sample size is 2400. Sampling is conducted 
using random selection methods that give every citizen of voting age an equal chance of 
being selected to the survey. The margin of error is given as ± 2.5 per cent. (Afrobarometer 
2012.) 
The sample is stratified based on certain key social characteristics in the population, such 
as geographical division (e.g. province/census enumeration area) and residential locality 
(urban/rural), but also based on probability that is proportionate to population size (PPPS), 
meaning that more interviews are conducted on densely populated areas than in sparsely 
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populated regions. Geographical stratification is hoped to reduce the likelihood that 
distinctive ethnic or language groups are being left out of the sample. Gender balance is 
guaranteed by selecting an equal number of men and women to the sample. 
(Afrobarometer 2012.) 
The amount of interviews in the sample (1200 or 2400) is stratified across the country first 
by area (region/province) and then by locality (urban/rural). The sampling is divided into 
four stages: (1) selection of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), (2) selection of sampling 
starting points, (3) selection of households and (4) selection of individual respondents 
within households. Random selection principles are applied in each stage, whenever 
possible. Primary Sampling Units usually correspond with Census Enumeration Areas (or 
EAs), which are the smallest geographical units from which census data is available. A 
maximum of eight interviews are collected from each selected PSU. In a sample size of 
1200 this means150 PSUs6 in a given country. The number of PSUs to be randomly 
selected among, e.g. rural areas of Region X, is determined by the proportion of national 
population living in those areas. If, for example, six per cent of the national population 
lives in rural areas of Region X, then the number of PSUs to be selected from those areas is 
nine (six per cent out of 150). (Afrobarometer 2012.) 
When the PSUs have been selected (Stage 1) a field team consisting of a field supervisor 
plus four interviewers will be sent to the location. If a list of all households in the PSU/EA 
is available, the Field Supervisor may skip Stage 2 and randomly select eight households 
from the list and send an interviewer to each of them. However, if there is no complete list 
of households available to the interviewers, a sampling starting point is randomly selected 
(Stage 2), from which the field team will start selecting households (Stage 3) using a 
special walking pattern. A respondent is randomly selected among all adult men or women 
(of voting age) from each household (each time a person representing a different gender 
than in the previous interview) of the household, excluding domestic workers or visitors. 
When eight interviews have been gathered, the field team will proceed to the next PSU. 
(Afrobarometer 2012.) 
                                                             
6 1200 divided by 8 
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Interviewers usually hold a first degree in social sciences, and they are trained in a five-day 
training workshop prior to the field mission. Surveys are conducted in a number of 
commonly spoken languages in each country. In the case of Kenya the languages used in 
the interviews include English, Kiswahili, Kauba, Kikuyu, Kimeru, Kisii, Luhya, Luo, 
Somali and Turkana. In Nigeria the languages include English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, 
(Nigerian) Pidgin, Tiv, Ibibio and Ijaw, whereas in Zimbabwe the languages being used are 
English, chiShona and isiNdebele. (Afrobarometer 2012.) 
3.1.2 Outlining the research data 
As already mentioned above, the Afrobarometer questionnaires typically consist of 
approximately 100 questions. Issues that I will focus on relate to (1) political and civil 
liberties, (2) democratic expectations of the people, (3) voting behavior, (4) perceived 
democratic performance of the country in question and (5) political support for various 
political actors and/or parties. Researchers of the Afrobarometer project have also 
identified a number of democracy indicators that I will use as an additional source for my 
data analysis. These democracy indicators are divided into four subgroups:  
 The meaning of democracy (what does democracy mean to you?)  
 The demand for democracy (support for multiparty democracy as opposed to 
military-, one-party-, or one-man-rule)  
 Democratic institutions (support for elections, term limits, party diversity, 
parliamentarianism, rule-of-law etc.)  
 The supply of democracy (satisfaction with democracy, political freedoms etc.)  
Afrobarometer summary reports of democracy indicators for Nigeria, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe provide an excellent comparison of indicator variables over three or more 
survey rounds in each three of these case countries. 
Questions that have been left out of the analysis relate mainly to (national) economic 
performance and personal living conditions or social participation/activism that is not 
political by nature. Also, questions about corruption (excluding vote-buying), local politics 
and the role of external actors, although interesting in their own right, are left out of the 
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analysis, as they do not seem to play a significant role in the conflict dynamics of the 
election-related struggles in Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe.  
3.2. ELECTION STATISTICS 
In order to provide a possibility to compare the Afrobarometer data with official election 
data, I have included some official figures from elections in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe 
in this presentation. This will provide a further basis for my analysis. The data is derived 
from the African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/), which is 
regarded as the most extensive and up-to-date dataset available on African election results 
from 1990 onwards and also considered fairly reliable by the Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services’ (NSD) MacroDataGuide (2012). The African Elections Database also 
supplements the election statistics with political profiles of each country including a 
categorization of the country’s political system. Kenya and Nigeria are classified as 
“emerging democracies” while Zimbabwe is considered to be a “restricted democratic 
practice”. This categorization is supported by Freedom House ratings for the three 
countries, which classifies Zimbabwe as “not free” and Kenya and Nigeria as “partly free” 
with respect to political freedom in these countries (Freedom House 2012). 
I will also present a few observations on some overall trends in African elections since 
1990, based on the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset 
which are being collected by the Department of Political Science at Yale University. 
NELDA covers almost every national election (legislative and executive) in the world from 
1945 to 2006, including extensive details from each electoral event. The list of countries 
covered by NELDA includes all independent states that have existed for any period of time 
between 1945 and 2006, excluding microstates with a population smaller than 500’000. 
The African microstates excluded from NELDA are Cape Verde, São Tomé & Príncipe 
and the Seychelles. 
3.2.1 The 2007 Nigerian Presidential Election  
The official results of the Nigerian Presidential Election of 2007 gave the incumbent 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and its presidential candidate Umaru Musa Yar’Adua a 
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landslide win with almost a 70 percent share of the votes. The two main opposition parties, 
the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) and the Action Congress (AC) received only a 
combined 26 percent of the total votes. However, an Afrobarometer survey (round 3.5) 
conducted only weeks before the April 21 polls predicted a much smaller winning margin 
for the ruling party. Only 33 percent of the Afrobarometer respondents claimed they would 
vote for the PDP, while the ANPP and the AC enjoyed a 24 percent and a 9 percent 
support respectively. In the Nigerian gubernatorial election, a clear majority of the 
governors’ seats went to the PDP, but the opposition parties managed to win the election in 
a few states. In some states the elections result that placed a PDP candidate in the lead 
were later annulled and an opposition candidate was declared the winner.  
21 April 2007 Presidential Election 
Registered voters 61,567,036  
Total votes (voter turnout) N/A  (approx. 58%) 
Invalid/Blank votes N/A  
Total valid votes 35,397,517  
 
Candidate (Party) Number of votes  % of votes 
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (PDP) 24,638,063 69.60% 
Muhammadu Buhari (ANPP) 6,605,299 18.66% 
Atiku Abubakar (AC) 2,637,848 7.45% 
Orji Uzor Kalu (PPA) 608,803 1.72% 
Attahiru Bafarawa (DPP) 289,224 0.82% 
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (APGA) 155,947 0.44% 
Pere Ajuwa (AD) 89,241 0.25% 
Christopher Okotie (FRESH) 74,049 0.21% 
Patrick Utomi (ADC) 50,849 0.14% 
Asakarawon Olapere (NPC) 33,771 0.10% 
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Ambrose Owuru (HDP) 28,519 0.08% 
Arthur Nwankwo (PMP) 24,164 0.07% 
Emmanuel Okereke (ALP) 22,677 0.06% 
Lawrence Adedoyin (APS) 22,409 0.06% 
Aliyu Habu Fari (NDP) 21,974 0.06% 
Galtima Liman (NNPP) 21,665 0.06% 
Maxi Okwu (CPP) 14,027 0.04% 
Sunny Okogwu (RPN) 13,566 0.04% 
Iheanyichukwu Nnaji (BNPP) 11,705 0.03% 
Osagie Obayuwana (NCP) 8,229 0.02% 
Olapade Agoro (NAC) 5,752 0.02% 
Akpone Solomon (NMDP) 5,664 0.02% 
Isa Odidi (ND) 5,408 0.02% 
Aminu Abubakar (NUP) 4,355 0.01% 
Mojisola Adekunle Obasanjo (MMN) 4,309 0.01% 
Table 1: African Elections Database 2012 
3.2.2 The 2007 Kenyan Presidential Election  
In Kenya, the pre-election polls predicted a close race between the incumbent president 
Mwai Kibaki and his main rival and a former cabinet member Raila Odinga, placing 
Odinga in a small but distinctive lead before the polls. However, the official election 
results showed a victory by a narrow margin for the incumbent, causing fierce and violent 
protests and accusations of an election fraud.  
27 December 2007 Presidential Election 
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Registered voters 14,296,180 
Total votes (voter turnout) N/A 
Invalid/Blank votes  N/A 
Total valid votes 9,877,028 
 
Candidate (Party) [Coalition] Number of votes  % of votes 
Mwai Kibaki (DP) [PNU] 4,584,721 46.42% 
Raila Odinga (ODM) 4,352,993 44.07% 
Kalonzo Musyoka (ODM-K) 879,903 8.91% 
Joseph Karani (KPTP) 21,171 0.21% 
Pius Muiru (KPP) 9,667 0.10% 
Nazlin Omar (WCP) 8,624 0.09% 
Kenneth Matiba (SSA) 8,046 0.08% 
David Waweru Ng'ethe (CCU) 5,976 0.06% 
Nixon Kukubo (RPK) 5,927 0.06% 
Table 2: African Elections Database 2012 
3.2.3 The 2008 Zimbabwean Presidential Election  
The first round of the Zimbabwean Presidential Election was held on 29 March 2008, but 
the results were withheld by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) for almost a 
month. Once released, they confirmed that the opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai 
had won the first round against the long-standing incumbent president Robert Mugabe of 
the ruling ZANU-PF, although he lacked the outright majority needed to avoid a second 
round. The run-off was scheduled to be held on 27 June 2008, but just a few days before 
the ballot Tsvangirai announced his withdrawal from the presidential race following a 
systematic campaign of terror against the opposition supporters by pro-Mugabe activists 
and ex-militants, which were backed by the state security forces. Nevertheless, 
Tsvangirai’s party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), did manage to win 
most of the seats in the House of Assembly, making Morgan Tsvangirai the Prime Minister 
of Zimbabwe.  
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March/June 2008 Presidential Election 
First Round (29 March 2008) 
Registered voters 5,934,768  
Total votes (voter turnout) 2,537,240  (42.8%) 
Invalid/Blank votes       39,975  
Total Valid votes 2,497,265 
 
 
Second Round (27 June 2008)  
Registered voters 5,934,768  
Total Votes (voter turnout) 2,514,750  (42.4%) 
Invalid/Blank votes     131,481  
Total valid votes 2,383,269 
 
 
 
Candidate (Party) First Round Second Round 
Number of votes % of votes Number of votes % of votes 
Morgan Tsvangirai 
(MDC) 
1,195,562 47.87% 233,000 9.78% 
Robert Mugabe 
(ZANU-PF) 
1,079,730 43.24% 2,150,269 90.22% 
Simba Makoni 207,470 8.31% - - 
Langton Towungana 14,503 0.58% - - 
Table 3: African Elections Database 2012 
3.2.4 African Elections 1990–2006 
The NELDA dataset shows that between 1990 and 2006 more than 330 national elections 
(presidential/parliamentary7) were held in 47 African countries8 with population over 
500’000. In more than 30 countries these were the first multi-party elections held in 
decades. However, in more than 50 percent of the elections there were significant concerns 
raised beforehand that the elections would not be free and fair.  The incumbent party lost in 
                                                             
7 Same-day elections are treated as separate events 
8
 Cape Verde, the Seychelles and São Tomé & Príncipe were not included in the dataset due to their small 
size. Eritrea, Libya and Somalia did not hold elections during the period of 1990–2006. 
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less than one election out of five. Electoral violence was prevalent in almost 30 percent of 
these elections. (Hyde & Marinov 2012.) 
4 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS 2007 
This election is a do-or-die affair. 
–Olusegun Obasanjo  
4.1 BACKGROUND: FROM MILITARY RULE TO MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS 
Throughout its post-independence history Nigeria has faced several military coups and 
been under military rule for extended periods of time. Return to civilian rule in 1999 raised 
hopes of a rapid democratization both among the civilian population and the international 
community. The Afrobarometer survey from 1999 shows a record high optimism and 
aspirations for democratic development in Nigeria, and all indicators showed a strong 
support for democracy and a clear rejection of military, one-party and one-man rule. It also 
showed the people’s confidence in good electoral conduct, as a clear majority of 
respondents (83.2 percent) viewed the 1999 elections as either quite or very honest.  
However, the 2003 elections were marred with serious misconducts both by election 
officials and the political contenders. Electoral violence was also widely prevalent in the 
form of political intimidation, assaults against rivaling candidates and their election rallies, 
beatings of potential supporters of political rivals, etc. The transition from military rule to 
multiparty politics in Nigeria has not been particularly smooth or easy a process, but 
despite the electoral irregularities, major setbacks in the democratization process have been 
avoided.  
4.2 THE 2007 ELECTIONS — A DO-OR-DIE AFFAIR 
The elections in 2007 should be viewed against the backdrop of intra-governmental rivalry 
between outgoing President Olusegun Obasanjo (PDP) and Vice-President Atiku Abubakar 
(AC), where Obasanjo’s attempt to change the constitution to allow him to run for third 
term as president was blocked by Abubakar. A prominent member of the PDP before 2006, 
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Abubakar left the ruling party due to a disagreement over Obasanjo’s bid for a third term, 
and he set out to run for president in the upcoming elections with the newly founded 
Action Congress opposition party’s ticket. Within the People’s Democratic Party there was 
an informal gentlemen’s agreement that the Presidency should rotate between 
predominantly Muslim northerners and Christian southerners every two terms. Obasanjo 
was a Christian with a southern Yoruba background. Abubakar as a Muslim from the 
northern state of Adamawa would have been a logical successor to Obasanjo after his 
second term in office. Instead, Obasanjo tried (but failed) to prolong his tenure by 
changing the constitution. 
Blocked from running for another term in office, Obasanjo was forced to find himself a 
successor. Giving up power can be a tough call for an ex-military dictator like Obasanjo, 
especially after being deprived an extra term in office by a personal ally. Abubakar, 
otherwise a prime candidate for the job, was now seen as a traitor by Obasanjo and thus 
unlikely to be selected as the presidential candidate of the ruling party. Instead Obasanjo 
chose Umaru Musa Yar’adua, a previously unknown governor of the northern Katsina 
state, as his successor. However, he was now facing a difficult task in lifting Yar’adua 
above Abubakar as the favourite in the presidential race. In a pre-election rally addressing 
PDP stakeholders Obasanjo announced that this election is a “do-or-die affair” for him and 
the ruling party (Pambazuka News 2007, July 28). 
Soon after Abubakar’s announcement that he was running for presidency with the AC 
ticket, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) released a report that 
accused the vice-president (Abubakar) of misappropriation of funds from the Petroleum 
Technology Development Fund (PTDF), which was managed under his supervision. Later 
the INEC disqualified Abubakar from the presidential race based on the EFCC report, but 
the Supreme Court overruled INEC’s decision and allowed Abubakar to run in the 
elections. It has been widely speculated that the charges against Vice-President Abubakar 
were politically motivated and that both the EFCC and the INEC worked under the 
influence of the President’s Office (ICG 2007b: 5–7). Political rivalry between outgoing 
President Obasanjo (PDP) and Vice-President Abubakar (AC) is also reflected in 
Afrobarometer data: over 77 percent of AC supporters considered the elections to be “not 
free” or “having major problems”, whereas 53.6 percent of the PDP supporters thought the 
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same, and 28.4 percent of AC supporters said they were very afraid of political 
intimidation and violence during election campaigns, compared to 22.9 percent among 
PDP supporters.  
The elections in 2007 were widely considered as one of the worst elections in Nigeria’s 
history. While hopes were high for the elections to bring Nigeria one step closer to 
becoming a fully democratic state, they turned out to be a complete fiasco with blatant 
rigging and widespread violence (ICG 2007a). The International Crisis Group (ICG) has 
listed a number of ways in which the elections were flawed:  
 intimidation of voters and, in some cases, election observers and monitors; 
 under-age voting; 
 hoarding of election materials by INEC officials, including ballots and result 
sheets; 
 ballot-box stuffing by dominant parties, often with the connivance of INEC and 
security officials; 
 theft of ballot boxes and ballot papers; 
 announcement of results where there was no voting, especially in the South East, 
South-South and North East; 
 refusal to make result sheets available to party agents, thus denying aggrieved 
candidates the chance to use them in arguing their petitions at the election tribunal; 
 diversion of ballots and result sheets so that powerful politicians could falsify 
results; 
 deliberate refusal to give certain polling stations adequate voting materials; and 
 various partisan acts by the INEC and security agents. 
(ICG 2007a: 3.) 
According to the ICG report on Nigeria’s 2007 elections, the ruling party (PDP) and 
opposition were both involved in the rigging, although the PDP had better access to state 
resources and was thus, in most cases, better equipped in “out-rigging” other parties (ICG 
2007a: 3). The PDP certainly had a great influence on the Independent National Election 
Commission (INEC) during the elections and was able to manipulate election results on 
state level in at least two states as well as on the national level in both presidential and 
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national assembly polls. However, it seems that the PDP’s control over the INEC was not 
absolute on state level as opposition parties still managed to keep some of the state 
governor seats in the gubernatorial elections. 
Due to the synchronized/(near-)simultaneous nature of the Nigerian electoral system, it 
may be difficult to distinguish between electoral violence linked to any particular round 
out of the three consecutive rounds of elections (gubernatorial, general and presidential 
elections) since electoral violence can take place in various stages of the electoral process. 
In the case of Nigeria, the post-election phase of the first round of elections (namely 
Gubernatorial/State Assembly Elections) overlaps with the pre-election phase of the 
second round of elections (namely National Assembly/Presidential Elections). However, 
due to the federal nature of Nigeria, state governors have a relatively high amount of power 
in local level politics within their respective states. Thus, election dynamics are likely to 
follow a slightly different pattern in gubernatorial elections compared to national elections 
(presidential and National Assembly). The PDP, although the ruling party on the national 
level, is in a somewhat weaker position to manipulate the electoral process in gubernatorial 
elections, especially in the states where the governor’s seat is held by an opposition party, 
mainly because the vote count is conducted on state level where the (non-PDP) opposition 
was better positioned to supervise the process. Since the ruling party was less able to 
manipulate election results through the INEC on the local/state level, especially in the 
states where PDP did not control the governor’s seat, it had to resort to other means in 
order to guarantee favorable results.  
Results from Afrobarometer Round 3.5 in Nigeria, conducted between January 19 and 
February 2, 2007, i.e. just before the April 2007 election, show that Nigerians were more 
interested in gubernatorial elections than in any of the upcoming national elections—
including the presidential election (Afrobarometer 2009b: 44–45). This interest may partly 
be explained by the fact that in gubernatorial elections the competition was more equally 
balanced and the election result could potentially have had more serious implications on 
the local level than the national elections where the outcome (a continued PDP dominance) 
and implications (business-as-usual) were perhaps easier to predict. The Human Rights 
Watch report from April 2007 points to the use of “thugs” by various PDP and opposition 
politicians in order to intimidate and attack political rivals during the election campaigns. 
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However, what is surprising is that many of the violent incidents that occurred before or 
during the April elections were related to intra-party rivalry within the ruling PDP and 
were typically linked to contests for PDP nominations to state governorships and seats in 
the national and state assemblies (HRW 2007a:13).  
The HRW report seems to suggest that electoral violence prior and during the April 
elections was used by prominent Nigerian political figures for personal political gains 
rather than to bolster the standing of their party (HRW 2007a). Nevertheless, electoral 
violence was also used between the PDP and the opposition groups, but criminal 
investigations were rarely conducted against prominent PDP members. Thus, it is not 
surprising to find that, according to Afrobarometer data, the police is among the least 
trusted institutions in Nigeria with 44.5 percent of Nigerians not trusting the police “at all” 
(and an additional 29.6 percent trusting the police “not very much/just a little”). Among the 
AC supporters, the mistrust towards the Police is even higher at around 54.5 percent. The 
police is also considered the most corrupt of all the security and political institutions and 
the most prone one to be subject of manipulation during the elections. The police have 
been accused of partisan acts in favor of the PDP, e.g. by providing exclusive protection to 
PDP candidates in gubernatorial elections beyond any justified security needs and failing 
to arrest or press charges against those PDP candidates who are publically known  to have 
sponsored electoral violence. Some incidents of harassment against opposition candidates 
by the police have also been reported. 
Contrary to the HRW and ICG reports, Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vincente (2008) claim 
that violent intimidation during the April 2007 elections was “a strategy predominantly 
linked to non-incumbent groups” (Collier & Vincent 2008: 4). They base their claim on the 
results of an anti-violence campaign conducted by an international NGO, ActionAid, 
involving 1149 survey respondents and the diaries of various journalists. However, Collier 
& Vincente do not provide further information on how these results were arrived at, 
making it difficult to assess the contradiction between their findings as opposed to the ones 
presented in the HRW and the ICG reports.  
Based on the model proposed by Collier & Vincente (2011), in cases of local level 
elections where an incumbent (of national level) face serious competition from the 
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opposition and the incumbent is unable to resort to vote rigging because he or she does not 
have full control of the vote counting process, he or she can either try vote buying or voter 
intimidation (besides conventional politics) in order to win the elections. As incumbency 
often involves direct access to state resources, incumbents are, in most cases, best 
positioned to pursue vote buying tactics during elections. However, the efficiency of vote 
buying in actually getting more votes is often doubtful as vote buyers rarely have any 
means to verify whether the voters actually voted for them or not. In fact, more than 40 
percent of the Nigerian respondents9 said they would take the money but vote for the 
candidate of their own choosing, should a candidate or a party official attempt to buy their 
vote. Nevertheless, 8 percent were ready to both take the money and vote according to 
their promise.  
Although politicians may not have the means to find out for whom a citizen votes they can 
monitor whether he/she votes at all. When voting is based along ethnic, religious or 
regional lines, potential opposition/political rival supporters may be relatively easy to spot 
and target with intimidation. In Nigeria, the use of thugs and cult members for political 
intimidation was prevalent during both the 2003 and the 2007 elections. However, the 
apparent contradiction between the findings of Collier & Vincente (2009), on the one hand, 
and Human Rights Watch and International Conflict Group on the other hand, could be 
explained by that political intimidation by the PDP was mainly targeted towards their 
political rivals (both within and outside the ruling party) whereas what Collier & Vincente 
call voter intimidation occurred more in connection of the opposition parties. The HRW 
report (2007b) also notes that political figures orchestrating electoral violence through cult 
members and criminal gangs may have to some degree lost control of the gangs they hired 
to intimidate political rivals and/or voters (HRW 2007b: 22–23). 
Another point that both the HRW and the ICG mention as encouraging electoral violence is 
the impunity enjoyed by the architects and sponsors of political violence in Nigeria (HRW 
2007a: 19; ICG 2007a: 14). Although some of the perpetrators of electoral violence 
(mainly gang and cult members) were brought to justice, Nigerian authorities failed to 
press charges against many of the politicians that had hired the perpetrators in the first 
place. Impunity may indeed turn out to be one of the key elements in explaining the 
                                                             
9 in Afrobarometer Round 3.5, 2007 
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prevalence of electoral violence in Nigeria. However, it may hardly come as a surprise that 
members of the ruling party generally enjoy much higher levels of impunity than their 
opposition counterparts. In Nigeria, opposition politicians and their supporters were much 
more likely to be on trial for electoral misconduct than PDP members (ICG 2007a: 14). 
Impunity lowers the costs of oppression significantly, but it is often closely tied to staying 
in power. Losing power could mean losing impunity, not only with regard to future 
election campaigns, but also with regard to crimes committed in the past. Leveraging on 
impunity during elections (e.g. through hiring thugs) may backfire if/when former 
incumbents no longer enjoy immunity from prosecution. Although impunity offers 
incumbents the opportunity to use dirty tricks to win elections, it also raises stakes for the 
next elections, because losing impunity would mean facing criminal charges, and thus it is 
likely to be avoided at all costs. Therefore, impunity, while lowering the costs of 
oppression in the short run, is likely to increase the costs of toleration in the long run. 
But if it is only the incumbents who benefits from impunity merely, why should the 
opposition resort to electoral violence? As already discussed above, the incumbents have 
an advantage with regard to many of the electoral strategies available to politicians. 
Incumbents are in a better position to use vote buying or electoral fraud to win elections. 
The opposition, on the other hand, may have the advantage in conventional politics, 
because they often enjoy popular support from the voters beyond the potential bias caused 
by the vote buying efforts of the incumbent. In Nigeria, however, the ruling party did 
(genuinely) enjoy greater popular support than any single opposition party albeit not to the 
extent that the official election results would seem to suggest. One of the few strategies 
with regard to which the opposition actually had a somewhat equal starting point with the 
ruling party was voter intimidation. Because incumbents want the elections to seem 
legitimate, they would not want to scare off the biggest bulk of voters from the ballot box, 
since low voter turnout is often perceived as a sign of low legitimacy. Rather, they would 
like to win the elections with as high a voter turnout as possible. The opposition, on the 
other hand, has much less to lose in the elections than the incumbent. In some situations, 
electoral victory by the incumbent may seem inevitable, so the best thing for the opposition 
to do is to make it look like the outcome is nothing but legitimate. Blaming the incumbent 
of ballot fraud is a common practice but often an ineffective one due to lack of proof. 
Collier & Vincente (2008: 4) suggest that when an opposition party is unable to turn the 
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popular vote to its advantage (either through vote buying or by conventional means), the 
best it can do is to maximize its share of votes by intimidating the voter turnout to be as 
low as possible (by targeting potential voters of their political contenders). They argue that 
this was also the case in Nigeria during the 2007 elections. 
4.3 NIGERIA AS AN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 
By definition, electoral authoritarian regime means a regime that holds regular multiparty 
elections but falls short of the democratic standard in other respects such as freedom and 
fairness of the elections. Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 and has held multiparty 
elections on a regular basis ever since. The presidential election of 2007 marked the very 
first transition of power from one publicly elected (civilian) president to another in 
Nigeria’s history. Yet, the same party remained in power, and the elections were far from 
perfect.  
How did the 2007 elections affect Nigeria in terms of regime transition? The 
Afrobarometer data shows clearly that prior to the 2007 elections, Nigerians wanted more 
democracy than they were actually getting. The demand for democracy, although down 
from its highest figures in 2000, was still above 70 percent in four out of five indicators: 
(1) support for democracy; (2) rejection of military rule; (3) rejection of one-party rule; and 
4) rejection of one-man rule. At the same time, the perceived supply of democracy, 
measured as percentage of respondents satisfied with the way democracy works in Nigeria, 
was 32.2 percent.   
4.4 KEY FINDINGS FROM THE AFROBAROMETER DATA 
The Afrobarometer data gives us an excellent opportunity to test some of the theoretical 
underpinnings by Dahl and others into our case study of Nigeria. I will now look into some 
of the political beliefs among Nigerians, as revealed by Afrobarometer, and see how well 
they resonate with the reasoning of Dahl in Polyarchy (1971). 
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The Afrobarometer data shows that among Nigerians, support for democracy as the most 
preferable form of government has remained high at 73.5 percent, being highest among the 
PDP supporters (81.4 percent). Multiparty democracy is clearly seen as a more legitimate 
form of government than military rule, one-party rule or one-man rule. Yet only 41 percent 
of all respondents both support democracy and reject all forms of autocratic regime. Also, 
elections still enjoy widespread (69 percent) support among Nigerians as the primary mode 
of selecting leaders, although not as high as in 2001 (85 percent). Comparison of the data 
from 2007 and 2008 show that support for elections has suffered a major blow after the 
2007 elections, with almost one third of the respondents thinking that Nigeria should adopt 
some other method than elections for choosing its leaders. A similar drop seems to have 
occurred during the 2005 elections which also suffered from major problems, but 
confidence in the elections seems to have improved in 2007 in the run-up to the elections. 
Nigerians also support other democratic institutions, such as term limits for incumbent 
presidents, the multiparty system and parliamentarism, with a clear majority of 
respondents. However, they seem to have little trust in the government agencies that are 
supposed to safeguard many of these institutions. For example, only 29.4 percent of the 
Figure 2: Elections vs. other methods for choosing leaders in Nigeria (Afrobarometer 2009a: 5) 
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respondents trusted the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In general, 
Nigerians have fairly little trust in their fellow citizens. 69.7 percent of respondents stated 
that they trust other Nigerians “just a little” or “not at all”. What is surprising is that 54.4 
percent do not even trust the people they know (besides relatives).  
Although a clear majority of Nigerians think that multiple parties are needed to provide a 
real choice in politics and equally many reject one-party rule, still almost two thirds of 
Nigerians think that opposition parties should rather focus on cooperating with the 
government than regularly examine and criticize the government’s policies and actions. In 
addition, more than three out of four Nigerians think that political competition will often or 
always lead to (violent) conflict. Rather, it is the task of the media and the civil society to 
question the actions of the leaders. Although public opinion in Nigeria would seem to 
favor political cooperation instead of competition, the mutual distrust within the society is 
likely to discourage political cooperation and reinforce a view of politics as a zero-sum 
game. All in all, there seems to be a slight bias towards an excessively competitive 
political culture in Nigeria, which, according to Dahl, favors autocratization (Dahl 1971: 
151). The least trusted among state agencies in Nigeria is the police, which 75.1 percent of 
the respondents found not trustworthy. Furthermore, 61 percent of Nigerians were 
dissatisfied with the performance of the police during the 2007 elections and 38 percent 
named the police as the security agency most subject to manipulation10 during the elections 
in Nigeria. State governors and party officials were most widely perceived as being 
responsible for the manipulation of the state agencies.   
                                                             
10 By comparison, the military was named by only 4 percent 
Table 4: Perceived freeness and fairness of the 2007 election in Nigeria (Afrobarometer 2012) 
BASE=1150 
Country 
Total Nigeria 
Q71. 
Elections 
free and 
fair 
Not free and fair 40.3 % 40.3 % 
Free and fair, with major problems 26.4 % 26.4 % 
Free and fair, but with minor 
problems 25.3 % 25.3 % 
Completely free and fair 7.2 % 7.2 % 
Do not understand question 0.9 % 0.9 % 
Total 1150 (100%) 1150 (100%) 
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With so much distrust in the society, it is no wonder that Nigeria is prone to winner-takes-
all politics, as the “do-or-die” comments by former President Obasanjo seem to suggest. A 
“do-or-die” mentality combined with the uncertainty that is naturally inherent in an 
electoral game may be too much for political actors to handle, particularly if there is more 
to lose than to gain. When the stakes are high, using illicit tactics to win elections may be a 
highly tempting avenue to choose. The Afrobarometer data reveals that two thirds of 
Nigerians perceived the April 2007 elections to be either “not free or fair” or “having 
major problems”. Even a majority of the PDP supporters considered the elections as not 
free or fair. Among supporters of the two main opposition parties the percentage was 
higher: PDP: 53.6%, ANPP: 60.8%, AC: 77.3%. Nigeria in general was considered to be a 
non-democratic country or a democracy with major problems by 56.4 percent of the 
respondents, with more than two thirds not satisfied with the way democracy works in 
Nigeria. Over 45 percent reported being at least somewhat afraid of political intimidation 
or electoral violence. On average, the PDP supporters were as afraid as the opposition 
supporters. This provides further evidence that voter intimidation was not solely 
orchestrated by the ruling party.  
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Although the demand for democracy is relatively high in Nigeria, the supply side has been 
dragging far behind, causing a clear democratic deficit. In a comparative study on African 
hybrid (electoral authoritarian) regimes, Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes conclude 
based on Afrobarometer data that most political regimes in Africa are unconsolidated 
hybrid systems, meaning that neither democratic supply nor demand are high enough for 
the regime to be considered a consolidated democracy11, nor are they low enough to be 
called a consolidated autocracy12 (Bratton & Mattes 2009: 2). This notion of an 
unconsolidated hybrid system corresponds broadly to Schedler’s and Lindberg’s notion of 
an electoral authoritarian regime. What is interesting to note is that in almost all African 
countries that have suffered from electoral conflicts in recent years, the demand for 
democracy is higher than the perceived supply. In Nigeria the perceived supply for 
democracy has come down considerably from 1999 to 2008, but at the same time the 
demand for democracy has also dropped in equal measure, making the trajectory look like 
                                                             
11
 Bratton & Mattes assume that a regime can be called a consolidated democracy when both perceived 
supply and demand for democracy are above 70 percent  (Bratton & Mattes 2009: 14) 
12
 A regime can be called a consolidated autocracy when the equilibrium of supply and demand for 
democracy is below 30 percent (ibid.). 
Figure 3: Demand for democracy in Nigeria (Afrobarometer 2009a: 4) 
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a distinct move towards autocratization. However, on a closer look we can see that from 
2005 onwards there has been, on average, a growing trend in the demand for democracy, 
save the exception of the curves for “patience with democracy” and “reject one-party rule”. 
Also, the supply for democracy has improved slightly in some indicators from 2005 to 
2008, but not as much as the demand. Thus, in other words, while a mid-term (10-year) 
trend in Nigeria up to 2008 suggests a trajectory of autocratization, a short-term (3-year) 
trend would hint towards a reversed trajectory (i.e. democratization). It is still too early to 
say whether the latest two cycles of elections in Nigeria (2007 and 2011) have reinforced 
the mid-term autocratization trend or the short-term democratization trajectory. 
Why then did electoral violence break out just in the middle of an upward democratization 
trend? It resembles, to some extent, a classic J-curve hypothesis by James Davies (1969), 
where in relatively closed societies a period of improving conditions and openness 
generate rising expectations among the population that often grow faster than the 
conditions are actually improving, causing declining satisfaction and leading to higher 
levels of instability in the society, thus potentially triggering violent conflicts (Davies 
1969). Some indications of this can be seen, for example, in the level of patience that 
Nigerians have with democracy. When asked about how patient they are with the present 
system of elected government (i.e. electoral democracy) in solving the problems prevalent 
within the system, almost 40 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement saying 
“if our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of 
government”. Out of the biggest parties, the ANPP supporters were the least patient with 
the prevailing system of democratic elections, with 46.9 percent agreeing with the 
statement above.  
When compared to Kenya and Zimbabwe, Nigeria differs from the other two countries in 
that the ruling party has still managed to a maintain relatively strong political support 
compared to its rivals, despite the inflated election results. This begs the question: why did 
Obasanjo resort to the do-or-die rhetorics and the use of illicit tactics if the PDP was likely 
to maintain its position as the ruling party even without resorting to any dirty tricks?  There 
are a few possible explanations: Maybe Obasanjo underestimated the actual political 
support the PDP was enjoying among Nigerians. After all, he must have known of several 
examples of former African rulers who had entered elections with a misguided belief that 
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they could easily win the elections using only conventional election tactics. Maybe he 
simply did not want to risk any chances that the PDP or his chosen successor Yar’Adua 
might lose the elections. It is reasonable to assume that there was a potential danger of a 
major internal split within the PDP due to the rivalry between Obasanjo and Abubakar. 
Although Obasanjo may have been confident about his own position within the PDP as the 
party leader, he may not have been so sure about how he could persuade all the northern 
PDP members to support Yar’Adua instead of Abubakar who was seen as the natural 
successor to Obasanjo before the third term incident.  
After the third term incident, Obasanjo had a strong motive to prevent Abubakar from 
becoming the next president of Nigeria. First of all, his political, material and physical 
security could depend on it. He could lose impunity and might have to face criminal 
charges, should Abubakar gain power. Secondly, it seems likely that, due to the third term 
incident, Obasanjo took the presidential race quite personally and wanted to demonstrate 
his political power by helping his hand-picked successor to a clear-cut victory against his 
political rivals. And a narrow second-round win would not do. It had to be a landslide 
win—and the most certain way to guarantee a landslide win would be to rig the ballot. 
Although the presidential election of 2007 was marred by an alleged electoral fraud, 
electoral violence seemed to be more endemic in gubernatorial elections. In a huge country 
like Nigeria, pursuing a landslide win in federal/national elections by resorting to vote 
buying or voter intimidation would often require a massive effort and could become too 
costly for the incumbents. For the incumbents, electoral fraud may be a cheaper solution 
than voter intimidation, both financially and politically, especially if politics in general is 
deemed to be a fishy business by the majority of citizens. However, in gubernatorial 
elections, the size of the constituency per each candidate is smaller and thus illicit means 
for affecting voting behavior of an individual voter become more effective in terms of 
increase in vote share. At the same time, opposition parties may be better positioned to 
monitor the vote count, making it more difficult (or politically costly) to rig the ballot in 
local level elections.  Therefore, vote buying and voter intimidation are likely to be the two 
main (illicit) strategies used in gubernatorial elections whenever the opposition has a 
strong support base within the constituency. According to Collier & Vincente (2012: 119), 
an incumbent is usually more likely to prefer vote buying as its main strategy over 
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electoral violence, mainly because incumbents usually have direct access to state resources 
and thus have more money in their possession. The opposition candidates, however, may 
rely either on conventional politics, trusting they have enough hardcore supporters to 
outweigh any possible vote buying attempts by the incumbent, or resort to voter 
intimidation hoping that a low voter turnout would turn the ballot to their advantage. 
In the case of the Nigerian gubernatorial elections, it seems that neither the PDP nor the 
opposition candidates had a fool-proof way of securing electoral victory in many of the 
highly contested areas of Nigeria without resorting to electoral violence. Furthermore, 
there was not only fierce competition between political parties but also within them during 
the primaries before the actual election. Much of the electoral violence involving the ruling 
PDP was related to intra-party rivalry and directed — not against voters — but directly 
against in-party rivals. After the primaries, many of the notorious politicians who had won 
the party ticket by intimidating and forcing their main competitors out of the race were 
now likely to try some of the same tactics against the opposition candidates in the actual 
elections. As a countermeasure, many competing politicians were compelled to hire their 
own “boys” for security against attacks or retaliation by their rivals (HRW 2007a: 28).  
What makes violent tactics worth considering is the low cost of oppression within the 
Nigerian legal/political system that is fed by the culture of impunity and the inefficiency 
and lack of professionalism within the Nigerian police force. For incumbent state 
governors seeking re-elections, the costs of toleration (namely losing the governor’s seat) 
may be somewhat painful in terms of having to give up many of the acquired benefits, but 
for challengers the potential gains of winning the election often outweigh the risks 
involved using dirty tricks. Electoral violence, although not the least risky of all illicit 
election tactics, is the one readily available to incumbents and challengers alike.  
4.5 DISCUSSION AND REMARKS 
In the case of the Nigerian elections in 2007, we can see how an internal split within the 
ruling party can have serious implications to the stability of an upcoming electoral process. 
For the first time since Nigeria’s return to civilian power in 2001, the PDP leadership felt 
its hegemonic position being threatened by a defected former party member that joined the 
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ranks of the opposition. Electoral autocrats seem to be fairly sensitive to electoral 
uncertainties, especially when the stakes are perceived to be high. As Schedler (2010a) and 
Lindberg (2009a) have pointed out, internal splits/defections and high stakes both play a 
significant role in the electoral metagame of regime transition, although not necessarily a 
parallel one. High stakes lead to high costs of toleration, which tends to hinder 
democratization and increase the likelihood of unfair competition through the use of illicit 
tactics such as sponsored electoral violence. Splits within the ruling party are likely to 
increase the competitiveness of the opposition, which may improve the prospects for 
democratization, since the incumbent can no longer afford to continue the autocratic 
business-as-usual without facing serious competition from the opposition.  
In the case of Nigeria, though, it may not be so plausible that the two main opposition 
parties (the AC and the ANPP) might actually be trying to make Nigeria any more 
democratic than the PDP is. Rather, it is the political competition itself that is likely to 
provide the main drive for democratization in Nigeria. Democratization is likely to even 
the odds for the opposition parties in their efforts to effectively challenge the incumbent 
party, regardless of their true motives for regime transition. Thus, it would be logical for 
the opposition to pursue democratization, because it is likely to help them compete with 
the ruling party.  Also, for the incumbent who is now facing serious competition from the 
opposition (and is likely to keep doing so in future elections), allowing democratization to 
take place may be a worthwhile strategy for bringing down the costs of toleration (i.e. the 
high stakes)—if democratization also includes a system of checks and balances that will 
restrict the winner-takes-all nature of elections in African electoral authoritarian regimes. 
In the short run, however, the incumbents rarely react to increasing competition by making 
concessions but rather by playing harder than before. 
Collier and Vincente’s (2011) research, although based on their own field study in Nigeria 
during the election period in 2007, seems to contradict somewhat with (or ignore) many of 
the remarks found in the Human Right Watch (2007a; 2007b) and International Crisis 
Group (2007a; 2007b) reports. Particularly the intra-party violence mentioned in the HRW 
reports seems to be totally ignored by Collier and Vincente, although it is, for the most 
part, associated with the local (gubernatorial/state assembly) elections and not with the 
national level (presidential/national assembly) elections, which Collier and Vincente’s 
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research mostly concerns. However, Collier and Vincente do raise the issue of vote buying 
which, according to the Afrobarometer data, has the potential to affect the voting behavior 
of at least eight percent of the voters. Collier and Vincente also acknowledge that the 
national and the local level elections do not necessarily follow the same trajectory in terms 
of illicit strategies available to the incumbent and the opposition politicians. On the one 
hand, electoral violence may have a higher cost-benefit ratio in local level elections 
compared to the national elections. On the other hand, electoral fraud may only be feasible 
on the national level. This seems to be somewhat consistent with what appears to be the 
case in the Nigerian 2007 elections, in which election fraud was used in the presidential 
election but electoral violence was more prevalent in the gubernatorial election.  
The Afrobarometer data corresponds seemingly well with Robert A. Dahl’s line of though 
in his book Polyarchy (1971: 150–152) concerning the importance of democratic beliefs 
and perceptions, and trust in fellow citizens, for the prospects of democratization. While a 
clear majority of Nigerians perceive democracy as the only acceptable form of government 
and elections as the most preferable way of choosing leaders, the government still is 
perceived more as “a patron” than “a servant of the people”, and the opposition is expected 
to cooperate with the government rather than to scrutinize it. Furthermore, “patience with 
democracy” has been on a downward trend since the early 2000’s, and more than two 
thirds of Nigerians have “a little or no trust” at all in their fellow citizens. According to 
Dahl (1971), mutual trust within the society is one of the key ingredients of democracy. 
Without an increased level of mutual trust among the Nigerian people, it is hard to imagine 
the country taking any major leaps towards democracy in the near future. 
5 KENYAN ELECTIONS 2007 
No Raila, no peace! 
– A slogan used by pro-opposition protesters during post-election riots in Kenya. 
5.1 BACKGROUND:  
In late December 2007, after a controversial announcement of disputed election results 
placing the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the presidential race with a 
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narrow margin against his main competitor Raila Odinga, Kenya slid into chaos that led to 
the death of more than a thousand Kenyans and left up to 500 000 persons displaced (HRW 
2008a: 2).  The region most affected by post-election violence was Rift Valley, with almost 
75 percent of all reported election-related deaths (Dercor & Gutiérrez-Romero 2011: 6) 
Kenya gained her independence in 1963 in much the same way as most other states in 
Africa—through a process led by an independence movement that later turned into a 
political party, in this case the Kenya African National Union (KANU)—and the country 
turned into a de facto one-party state. In 1978, the political opposition was suppressed with 
an amendment to the constitution that made Kenya also a de jure one-party state, banning 
all other parties from competing against KANU in any elections. After the end of the Cold 
War in 1991, the incumbent regime was forced to re-introduce multi-party elections. The 
ruling party managed to win the first few cycles of multi-party elections in the 1990s, 
albeit amid electoral irregularities and violence. After nearly 40 years of one-party rule, 
KANU finally lost the presidency in 2002 when a coalition of opposition parties united as 
the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) behind a single presidential candidate, Mwai 
Kibaki, and won the presidential election. (Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero 2012: 732.) 
NARC pledged to correct many of the underlying problems of the existing political regime, 
including the settlement of long-standing land grievances dating back to the end of the 
colonial era, when some of the land seized by the British colonists (‘the white highlands’) 
was handed over (or sold) to the Kenyan government instead of giving these lands back to 
their original owners. The government then sold the land to those willing to buy them—
ignoring the customary land use practices—and much of these lands ended up in the hands 
of the Kikuyu, the ethnic group of the first President of Kenya and KANU leader Jomo 
Kenyatta (Kanyinga 2009: 330; HRW 2008a: 12–13).  There was a fierce competition 
concerning land rights between the two largest ethnic groups of the region, the Kalenjin 
and the Kikuyu, in the Rift Valley Province in particular.  
Despite political liberalization of the early 1990s, the ruling party (KANU) had originally 
no intention of letting go of the political power in favor of the newly formed opposition. 
Thus, the first cycles of multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997 were marred with state-
sponsored pre-election violence. Now facing the risk of losing control of the centralized 
 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA                       51 
 
 
Kenyan state, the incumbent government under President Daniel arap Moi resurfaced an 
old debate about Majimbo13, this being a federalist system of governance in which regions 
would enjoy high levels of autonomy. Majimbo was originally advocated by KANU’s 
main rival party during the independence era, the Kenya African Democratic Union 
(KADU), the constituency of which consisted mainly of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and 
Samburu ethnic groups (also known as the KAMATUSA).  KADU lost the 1963 elections 
and its leadership was soon co-opted into KANU. President Moi himself had a Kalenjin 
background, and he was one of the founders of KADU before joining the ruling KANU in 
early 1960s. 
According to Karuti Kanyinga (2009), a researcher at the University of Nairobi, the 1991 
re-introduction of the multi-party system was perceived by many of the Kalenjin as a 
potential threat of a renewed Kikuyu/Luo dominance in Kenya, so they rallied once again 
for the Majimbo system like they had done in the 1960s in order to secure their regional 
interests (particularly what comes to land rights) within the Rift Valley Province 
(Kanyinga 2009: 336).  The prospects for renewed Majimboism encouraged some KANU 
supporters (mainly Kalenjin) to resort to electoral violence, which was aimed at driving out 
“foreign” ethnic groups as well as forcing potential opposition voters (namely the Kikuyu) 
back to the regions of their origin and claiming back the land they considered to be part of 
their customary home land (Kasara 2009: 5).  
In the 2002 presidential election, Daniel arap Moi could no longer run for another term due 
to the constitutional two-term restriction, so the KANU chose Uhuru Kenyatta, son of 
former President Jomo Kenyatta, as their presidential candidate to run against Mwai 
Kibaki of NARC. With both candidates having a Kikuyu background, there was practically 
no room for ethnic confrontation in the election. The appeal of a multi-tribal NARC to 
voters was based on the idea of national unity rather than on specific ethnic interests, and 
in its campaign it promised to address the land issue and decentralize presidential powers 
by creating a prime minister’s post that would share some of the powers formerly vested in 
the president’s seat. Post-election power-sharing and a constitutional reform agenda were 
agreed upon in a signed memorandum of understanding between the participant members 
of the NARC coalition (ICG 2008a: 2). The NARC won the election overwhelmingly, and 
                                                             
13 Swahili word for “regions” 
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by all standards the general election of 2002 was deemed to have been highly successful, 
with less reported rigging or electoral violence than in any of the previous multi-party 
elections since 1991. For the first time in Kenya’s history, a relatively free and fair election 
also resulted in a peaceful handing of power from one democratically elected president to 
another one that represented a different (and most notably non-incumbent) political party. 
The prospects for further democratization in Kenya looked bright.  
However, once elected, the Kibaki administration failed to implement many of the 
promises made during the election campaign. The ruling coalition soon found themselves 
in internal disputes about the constitutional reform. Kibaki was driving for the 
concentration of political power to the presidency and for the weakening of the regional 
governments, while other prominent coalition members, such as Raila Odinga, sought to 
establish a prime minister’s position to reduce the power of the president through power-
sharing. The final draft of the constitution, dictated by President Kibaki and his allies, was 
to be ratified in a constitutional referendum in 2005, in which Kibaki and his allies 
campaigned for a “yes” vote and Odinga among others campaigned for a “no”. Kibaki’s 
side lost the referendum with 42 percent (“yes” vote) against 58 percent (“no”), which led 
to Kibaki sacking his entire cabinet and appointing new ministers mainly from his own 
circles—leaving Raila Odinga and other “no” proponents excluded from the new cabinet. 
The block that had campaigned against the new draft constitution formed a new party 
called the Orange14 Democratic Movement of Kenya (ODM) and prepared to challenge 
Kibaki in the upcoming elections of 2007. However, in August 2007, just four months 
prior to the election, the ODM split into two separate factions over a disagreement on who 
should run for president with the party’s ticket in the upcoming election. One of the two 
factions, that is, the ODM, was headed by Raila Odinga, while the other (ODM-K) was 
headed by Kalonzo Musyoka. Also, the former ruling party KANU had supported the 
Orange block in the referendum, but subsequently opted to align themselves with Kibaki’s 
party and chose to support his re-election in the 2007 presidential election. After the 2005 
referendum, it had seemed clear that Odinga’s ODM would beat Kibaki in the 2007 
election, but after the ODM split and KANU jumped on the Kibaki bandwagon, the setting 
before the election looked like it was going to be a close two-horse race.  
                                                             
14 Orange was the symbol of the ’no’ vote in the constitutional referendum as opposed to a Banana symbol 
of the ‘yes’ vote. The fruit symbols were meant for helping illiterate Kenyans to express their voting 
preference in the referendum.  
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5.2 TWO STEPS TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION, ONE STEP BACK 
The 1991 re-establishment of a multi-party system provided a good starting point for the 
democratization process in Kenya. Despite several flaws found in the first cycles of multi-
party elections in 1992 and 1997, the opposition parties soon learned the craft of coalition 
building and managed to challenge the incumbent party successfully in the 2002 election. 
The incumbent president Moi’s decision to respect the constitutional two-term limit and to 
withdraw from the presidential race also played a significant role in the peaceful transition 
of power from the incumbent KANU to the opposition, the National Rainbow Coalition. 
The level of electoral violence in the 2002 elections was significantly lower than in the 
previous elections, and ethnic confrontation was this time mostly absent, as both of the two 
main contenders, Uhuru Kenyatta (KANU) and Mwai Kibaki (NARC), came from the 
same ethnic group, namely the Kikuyu. The seemingly independent and neutral Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) under the leadership of Chairman Samuel Kivuitu was 
widely given credit for keeping the election free and fair.   
The 2005 constitutional referendum can also be seen as a victory for democratic 
aspirations over an autocratic scheme to centralize more political power into the hands of 
the president. Not only was it the second time in a row when an incumbent government 
was forced to accept defeat by ballot in Kenya, but also the second peaceful polling in a 
row without serious accusations of vote rigging. The 2005 referendum was an indication of 
yet another looming defeat for the incumbent president in the upcoming presidential 
election of 2007. However, the internal disputes within the ODM, which eventually led 
into its breaking into two factions, gave the incumbent regime a glimpse of hope of a re-
election. The decision by the KANU leadership to support Kibaki in the presidential race 
may have polarized the constituencies along ethnic lines, as the two prominent Kikuyu 
party leaders (Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta) were now on the same bandwagon. 
Although not completely desperate the situation looked rather challenging for Kibaki, as 
the pre-election polls indicated a small but distinctive lead for Odinga. Given that Kibaki 
had deliberately ignored the promises he had made prior to the 2002 elections, that once 
elected, he would make Odinga prime minister, and that he had failed in his attempt to 
amend the constitution to his personal gain in 2005, the stakes in the upcoming presidential 
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election seemed much higher than they would have been had Kibaki implemented the 
memorandum of understanding signed by the members of the NARC coalition in the run-
up to the 2002 elections. Then again, it seems that Kibaki was already preparing to rig the 
election two months prior to the ballot by appointing five new ECK commissioners 
without consulting the other parties—a clear violation of a 1997 inter-party agreement 
(ICG 2008a: 6).   
According to the ICG report No. 137 on Kenya’s electoral crisis, all the major national and 
international election observers reported that  
[w]hile the voting and counting of ballots at polling-station level was orderly and 
satisfactory with a few exceptions, the tallying and compiling of the results was 
manipulated, dramatically undermining the credibility of the results Kivuitu 
[Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya] announced on 30 December. (ICG 
2008a: 6) 
There is little doubt that the 2007 presidential election was blatantly rigged in favor of the 
incumbent, President Kibaki. The ODM had been warning about potential election rigging 
several times, both before and during the vote count. Speculations of a possible 
manipulation of election results increased on 29 December, when the announcement of the 
election result was postponed. When the official results were finally announced on 30 
December, the ODM denounced the announcement and accused Kibaki of stealing the 
election. Many of the hardcore ODM supporters had prepared themselves for this 
possibility and were swift to express their outrage on the streets. According to Dercon & 
Gutiérrez-Romero (2012: 735), violence spread across much of the country within hours of 
the announcement that Mwai Kibaki had won the election. There are indications that in 
Rift Valley some Kalenjin politicians had been urging the Kalenjin youth to begin a 
campaign of violence against the Kikuyu, should there be any indication of Kibaki trying 
to steal the elections (HRW 2008a: 37). The Kalenjin-based radio station Kass FM was 
reported to have aired inflammatory anti-Kikuyu statements prior to the election (ICG 
2008a: 13). The police was also accused of using brutal force in attempts to suppress the 
street protests that resulted in dozens of casualties.  
5.3 KEY FINDINGS 
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It is commonly perceived that the main trigger of the 2007–2008 post-election violence in 
Kenya was the blatant rigging of the election results in favor of the incumbent president 
Kibaki. This idea is widely shared by researchers who have studied this instance of post-
electoral violence in Kenya (see e.g. Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero 2012). It is also a 
common belief among Kenyans that the violence erupted mainly because it was perceived 
that the election had been rigged (ibid., p. 2). However, the underlying root causes of the 
violence are likely to run much deeper. As indicated by Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero and 
reports by the International Crisis Group (2008), the Human Rights Watch (2008) and the 
Waki Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) Final Report 
(CIPEV, 2008), land disputes, sometimes running back to the colonial era, have provided a 
fruitful soil for ethnic agitation, and it has been a populist theme for politicians to leverage 
on in their campaigns. In an Afrobarometer study in 2003, one out of three Kenyans (33.6 
percent) named “boundary and land disputes” as the main cause of conflict between 
communities/ethnic groups in Kenya (Afrobarometer 2012). “Animals/lifestock” was the 
second most common cause of conflict at 11.8 percent.    
Majimbo aspirations appealed to many of the Kalenjin, particularly because regional self-
determination was seen as a solution to the land issue and as a way to regain control over 
the “ancestral land” from the “outsiders”. The ODM was very much aware of these 
aspirations as its leadership included prominent Kalenjin politicians, but due to the 
negative undertones that majimboism raised in the minds of other Kenyans who associated 
majimboism with the ethnic clashes of the 1990s, the ODM tried to distance itself from the 
concept while still advocating the idea of decentralizing state power, knowing that the 
confusion would help it gain a maximum amount of votes in the KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, 
Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) communities (ICG 2008a: 4–5).  
The CIPEV report, along with the ICG and the HRW reports, point to the fact that, 
although much of the post-election violence erupted as a spontaneous reaction to the 
announcement of the (rigged) election results, there are indications that in some locations 
the violence erupted already prior to this announcement. There is also evidence of pre-
planned violence, designed to be unleashed at any indication of the ODM losing the 
elections when the votes are counted (CIPEV 2008: 41). The Kenyans in general did not 
sympathize with the use of violence “in support of a just cause”—according to the 
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Afrobarometer study of 2005 more than 80 percent agreed with the statement that “the use 
of violence is never justified in Kenyan politics”. However, among Kalenjin and Maasai15 
respondents, more than 30 percent approved the use of violence to support a cause that was 
perceived to be a just one. 
From the incumbent’s (i.e. Kibaki’s) perspective, the 2007 election may have seemed like 
a zero sum game after they had lost the referendum in 2005, but they may not necessarily 
have considered it to be a high-staked one, such as e.g. the first cycles of multi-party 
elections in Kenya during the 1990s. Kibaki, for one, did not have a heavy payload of past 
atrocities that could prove to his disadvantage in the face of an election defeat. Nor did he 
rely on a long-established system of patronage for political support, since it was his first 
term in office. In the pre-election polls, Kibaki was not too far behind Odinga, and thus it 
was possible for him to be able to beat Odinga without resorting to illicit tactics in the 
actual ballot. Why, then, did Kibaki resort to election fraud in order to secure his second 
term? A plausible explanation would be that in his mind the cost–benefit ratio of 
oppression (in the form of vote rigging) out-weighed the cost–benefit ratio of toleration. If 
playing fair was likely to mean a defeat at the polls, then the prospect of securing a second 
term without anyone noticing the fraud (or even despite the possible implications if 
someone did) may have seemed rather tempting. Maybe Kibaki simply underestimated the 
potential implications of getting caught of stealing the election. Maybe his hunger for 
power overcame his respect for the rule of law. Nevertheless, during Kibaki’s first term in 
office, he may have begun to think that toleration would be more likely eventually to cost 
him the next elections, and the result would be a regime change.  
Firstly, Kibaki’s decision to reap the benefits of incumbency and to ignore the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the opposition parties of the NARC 
coalition prior to the 2002 election—expecting Kibaki to create a prime minister’s post for 
Odinga after he had been elected as president—must have been a huge disappointment for 
Odinga and other politicians who sought to reduce the powers vested in the presidency 
(CIPEV 2008: 29). Instead of bringing about a transition towards a more democratic 
regime he had promised, he seems to have opted for a regime reproduction (or even 
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 Yet, it should be noted that the sample of Maasai respondents in the Afrobarometer survey was so small 
(17 out of 1253) that it may not adequately represent the whole Maasai community. 
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autocratization) with his attempt to change the constitution in order to centralize power 
even more in the hands of the president. The turncoat policy also contributed to a rising 
cost of the political oppression, as the opponents of the draft constitution scheme were now 
uniting against Kibaki in the upcoming elections and they seemed to be enjoying wide 
popular support, as indicated by the result of the constitutional referendum of 2005. 
Implementing oppression tactics (in the form of ballot rigging) led to a further increase in 
the costs of toleration; a former ally, now a turncoat who is trying to steal the election, is 
not likely to be treated nicely by his political rivals. As the stakes for Kibaki were getting 
higher, so was also the bitterness among many opposition supporters, particularly the 
Kalenjin, who—like many other Kenyans—perceived that the president is biased towards 
his own ethnic group, the Kikuyu, with whom the Kalenjin have an uneasy relationship in 
Rift Valley, their home province. Furthermore, according to the Afrobaromerer data, three 
out of four Kalenjins thought that “since leaders represent all of us, they should not favor 
their own family or group” whereas more than 40 percent of the Kikuyu (and the Luo) 
agreed with the statement: “once in office, the leaders are obliged to help their home 
community”, indicating that the Kalenjin were less tolerant of ethnic clientelism than the 
Kikuyu (or the Luo) (Afrobarometer 2012). 
The Afrobarometer data reveals that the trust in the presidency has suffered a major decline 
during Kibaki’s rule, from 81.4 percent in 2003 to 56.3 percent in 2008, although still 
remaining relatively strong compared to many other African countries. At the same time, 
the trust in the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was growing steadily from 54.5 
percent in 2003 to 60.4 percent in 2005—thanks to well conducted elections and 
referendum in 2002 and 2005—but crashed heavily after the 2007 elections to only 25.4 
percent in 2008. According to Afrobarometer (2012), the support for democracy has 
remained high throughout the early 2000s at above 85 percent. However, the public 
perception of the state of democracy in Kenya shows that in 2008 only 46.2 percent of 
Kenyans saw their country as “a full democracy” or “a democracy with minor problems”, 
and almost 55 percent were not satisfied with the state of democracy, whereas in 2003 
almost 80 percent had considered Kenya a democracy without any major problems and 
82.9 percent had been satisfied with the democratic situation in the country. 
(Afrobarometer 2012.) 
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Unsurprisingly, a clear majority of Kenyans considered the 2007 election to have been “not 
fair”. The Kalenjin, on average, had the most critical stance towards the freeness/fairness 
of the elections with more than 90 percent claiming the election to have been either “not 
free or fair” or “having major problems”. Although less critical, almost two thirds of the 
Kikuyu considered the election to have been generally not free or fair. According to the 
Afrobarometer data, the voting during the 2007 elections went, for the most part, along 
ethnic lines. The Luo, the Luhya and the Kalenjin tended to vote overwhelmingly for Raila 
Odinga’s ODM, whereas the Kikuyu and the Meru voted mostly for Mwai Kibaki’s Party 
of National Unity (PNU). On the province level, the ODM should have gathered the 
majority of votes in six out of eight provinces, excluding the Central and the Eastern 
province. In the official results, Kibaki won the ballot in four provinces including the 
Central, Eastern, North Eastern and Nairobi provinces (ECK 2007). (Afrobarometer 2012.) 
Afrobarometer data also reveals how different ethnic groups experienced to the electoral 
violence during and/or after the 2007 elections or how they reacted to it. In the Rift Valley 
Province, 54.5 percent of the Kikuyu respondents were greatly afraid of political violence 
and intimidation during the elections. By comparison, in the Central Province—where the 
majority of the Kikuyu in Kenya reside—only 26.7 were very afraid of electoral violence. 
In Rift Valley, also the Kisii and the Luhya feared there would be violence, whereas only 
25.2 percent of the Kalenjin reported being very afraid. Of the Luo in the Nyanza Province, 
more than 60 percent were very afraid. (Afrobarometer 2012.) 
5.4 DISCUSSION AND REMARKS 
Unlike in Nigeria, the electoral crisis of Kenya was predominantly a post-election one, 
triggered by an election fraud that gave the incumbent a narrow victory in the polls, against 
the odds and the expectations of the majority of the Kenyans. Having a respectable track 
record from the past two ballots, the ECK, under the leadership of Samuel Kivuitu, was 
expected to guarantee the fairness of the election. Failing to do so was a huge 
disappointment to the opposition and its supporters. The fact that Kibaki had only been in 
office for five years and was not accustomed to the use of brute force to suppress his 
political rivals, may have encouraged the opposition supporters to express their outrage 
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about the election fraud more openly and perhaps violently than they would have done in 
the past. 
Past grievances were, to some extent, used as a pretext for mobilizing opposition 
supporters into protests. Land disputes in the Rift Valley Province have a long history of 
causing ethnic tensions between the “indigenous” Kalenjin and other ethnics groups that 
have migrated to the region more recently. High hopes for gaining more regional 
autonomy—thus more power to their own ethnic group, which forms the majority within 
their home province, in case the ODM won the presidential race—is likely to have 
motivated the Kalenjin in Rift Valley to protest fiercely against the alleged election fraud 
by Mwai Kibaki. 
From Kibaki’s point of view, there would not seem to have been any compelling reasons to 
cheat so boldly in the elections other than either hunger for power or some kind of a 
miscalculation of the costs of oppression and/or toleration. However, at the end of the day, 
Kibaki did manage to negotiate himself a second term in office. Yet, merely the inclusion 
of an agreement of power-sharing in the draft constitution of 2005 might have been 
sufficient to grant Kibaki a second term without the need to resort to vote rigging. In any 
case, there is something in the Kenyan electoral crisis that cannot simply be explained by 
Lindberg’s notion of the costs of oppression/toleration without the complementary notion 
of the benefits of oppression/toleration that is absent in Lindberg’s original theory. 
Collier & Vincente’s (2012) notion of the three illicit electoral tactics comes helpful when 
analyzing the Kenyan case. When winning the election by conventional means seems 
unlikely, the autocratic leader will most often resort to one or more of the three illicit 
tactics presented by Collier & Vincente, namely vote buying, voter/opponent intimidation 
and election fraud. The problem with voter/opponent intimidation strategy is that it 
requires either a large base of hardcore supporters capable of unleashing an intimidation 
campaign or a strict control over the state monopoly of violence (the police and/or the 
military) and a willingness of those who represent the latter to step beyond the rule of law. 
Kibaki, lacking a history of autocratic rule and a hardcore support base (save the outlawed 
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Kikuyu Mungiki sect16), must have considered the odds to be more favorable if he engaged 
himself in election fraud than if he went for intimidation. 
Kibaki may have underestimated the high democratic demand that has remained constant 
among Kenyans throughout the first decade of the 21st century. With more than 85 percent 
of the Kenyans supporting democratic ideals at the time when the incumbent president 
decides to rig the elections, it is quite surprising that Kibaki still got away with a second 
term in office. Nevertheless, such a strong reaction to election rigging may be interpreted 
as a somewhat firm commitment by the Kenyan population to the democratization process, 
albeit the high level of violence that followed the perceived vote rigging may at the same 
time undermine some of the democratic credibility of the Orange Democratic Movement 
and its leader Raila Odinga.  
6 ZIMBABWEAN ELECTIONS 2008 
We are not going to give up our country for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ballpoint 
fight with a gun? 
–Robert Mugabe  
6.1 BACKGROUND:  
The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has been the 
hegemonic ruling party in Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980—at least until 2008, 
when the Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T), to the surprise of 
many, won the parliamentary election and was about to beat Robert Mugabe also in the 
presidential election, forcing ZANU-PF to form a Government of National Unity together 
with the MDC-T. Zimbabwe’s economy was doing very well during the first decade of 
Mugabe’s reign, but started to decline in the 1990s, causing rising political and social 
discontent in large sections of the population (Onslow 2011: 4). The Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) emerged in 1999 as a product of this discontent.  
                                                             
16 See ICG (2008: 9). 
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The ZANU-PF suffered its first defeat in a constitutional referendum in 2000, in which its 
draft constitution that would have extended presidential powers was rejected. The MDC 
rallied against ZANU-PF’s draft constitution while advocating a counter-draft from the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a civil society organization aiming at initiating a 
democratic constitutional dialogue in Zimbabwe. Baffled by the unexpected defeat, 
Mugabe responded with a wide scale state-sponsored violence against MDC activists and 
supporters in the parliamentary election of 2000 and in the presidential election of 2002. 
The government tried to compensate its diminishing support by letting the “war-
veterans”17 invade and seize white-owned farms, and by later using them as a proxy to 
terrorize and intimidate opposition activists (Kebonang 2012: 11). Mugabe’s regime also 
introduced new repressive legislation, directed against the opposition, such as the Public 
Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act that were used to curtail basic freedoms and to stifle opposition activities (Onslow 
2011: 8; ICG 2008c: 3). 
The international community reacted to these repressive measures by placing economic 
sanctions on Zimbabwe. Mugabe, in effect, blamed the sanctions for the economic crisis in 
the country, which in reality had much more to do with the poor policy decisions of the 
Mugabe regime in the 1990s and the increasingly disastrous monetary and fiscal policies of 
the ZANU-PF (Onslow 2011: 6). After the 2005 elections, Mugabe launched Operation 
Murambatsvina18, an eviction campaign in the high-density urban areas of Zimbabwe, to 
punish the urban population, who mostly voted for the MDC in the elections (HRW 2008b: 
11). Another major crackdown against the opposition occurred in March 2007, when the 
MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and several other MDC and civil society activists were 
brutally beaten by the police (HRW 2008b: 12). The incident prompted the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) to launch a mediation process in Zimbabwe led 
by Thabo Mbeki, then President of South Africa (Badza 2008: 6). Although criticized of 
being overly sympathetic towards Mugabe and the ZANU-PF, Mbeki managed to bring the 
two parties to a common table and agree on some minor reforms to the repressive 
legislation before the upcoming elections. The opposition had high hopes that a 
                                                             
17
 Many of the so-called “war-veterans” were allegedly too young to have fought in the liberation war. It is 
suspected that Mugabe’s regime was simply using younger men led by the real war-veterans as proxies for 
intimidating opposition activists. 
18 Murambatsvina means “Clear the Filth” 
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constitutional reform would take place prior to the elections, but despite promises made to 
the MDC, Mbeki failed to persuade Mugabe to adopt the new jointly agreed constitution 
before the March 2008 elections or to postpone the elections so that there would be more 
time to set up a national constitutional referendum (ICG 2008c: 7). 
One of the major problems undermining the prospect for a free and fair election in 
Zimbabwe was the fact that practically all the heads of Zimbabwe’s security service 
agencies — namely the military, the police, the central intelligence organization and the 
prison service — were openly partisan towards the ZANU-PF. One of the army generals 
stated that the army would not support or salute any other president than Mugabe after the 
upcoming elections (HRW 2008b: 18). The heads of the security services comprise a 
secretive council known as the Joint Operations Command (JOC), which is known for 
having orchestrated repressive action against the opposition and the civil society 
throughout the 2000’s (Sachikonye 2009: 5). Although not necessarily directly involved in 
the political intimidation, the military and the JOC have provided logistical support to the 
“war-veterans” and the youth militia (the Green Bombers), who are most often seen as the 
main perpetrators of political violence in Zimbabwe.  
6.2 THE RUN-UP TO AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE 29 MARCH ELECTIONS 
Much like in the previous few elections, the run-up to the 29 March 2008 polls was marred 
by voter intimidation and election irregularities. For the first time in Zimbabwe’s history, 
all the major elections (presidential, house of assembly, senatorial and local government 
elections) were “harmonized”, i.e. to be conducted on the same day. The ZANU-PF had 
insisted on the harmonization of the elections during Mbeki’s inter-party talks in hopes that 
Mugabe’s anticipated victory in the upcoming presidential race would help the party get 
more seats also in other elections (Badza 2008: 6). The MDC had accepted the 
harmonization because of Mbeki’s promise that a constitutional reform would take place 
before the elections (ICG 2008c: 2). The Constitutional Amendment No 18, which made 
simultaneous elections possible, was important to the ZANU-PF also because it gave the 
two Houses of Parliament the power to appoint a successor to the president for the 
remainder of his term in case he steps down or is unable to complete his term e.g. due to 
illness or death. It has been widely speculated that the ZANU-PF was seeking an 
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opportunity to select a successor to Mugabe without risking a failure in the elections. 
Should all go to plan, Mugabe could hand-pick a successor after the elections and retire 
without the fear of the MDC taking over before the next scheduled elections. Thus the 
successor could get a head start with the presidency before the next elections and would be 
in a good position to compete for re-election. However, a two-thirds majority in both 
Houses of Parliament would have been needed for Mugabe to be able to hand-pick his 
successor. The ZANU-PF clearly was not expecting to lose that majority.    
Both the MDC and the ZANU-PF suffered internal splits prior to the 2008 elections. The 
MDC was split into MDC-Tsvangirai and MDC-Mutambara factions after the 2005 
senatorial election, following a disagreement on whether the party should participate in 
future elections or boycott them until they would be perceived free and fair.  In the run-up 
to the March 2008 elections, Simba Makoni, a prominent member of the ZANU-PF 
politburo, announced he was challenging Robert Mugabe and running in the presidential 
election as an independent candidate. There had previously been speculations about 
Makoni being a potential successor/replacement for Mugabe (ICG 2008c: 13). With the 
MDC factions failing to reach an agreement on a single MDC candidate, the MDC-
Mutambara decided instead to back Makoni in the presidential race. Although the ZANU-
PF may have been confident that this time it could easily defeat the divided MDC 
opposition, the Makoni challenge was likely to cast a shadow of doubt on Mugabe and the 
ruling party.  
Like most of the previous elections in Zimbabwe since the 2000 constitutional referendum, 
the 2008 elections were expected to be flawed to some extent. Morgan Tsvangirai stated 
prior to the announcement of the election results that even if the ZANU-PF admitted their 
defeat the elections would still not have been free or fair (Badza 2008: 9). Although not as 
violent as some of the previous elections, the run-up to the 29 March 2008 elections were 
being characterized as being far from “a fair competition”. The incumbent was shamelessly 
leveraging on state resources and the control of the media to its advantage in the election 
campaigns. The state media had a clear anti-opposition editorial policy. As mentioned 
before, the heads of state security services or the Joint Operation Command were openly 
biased for the ZANU-PF. Also the impartiality of the Zimbabwe Elections Committee 
(ZEC) had been questioned.  
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The election day of 29 March 2008 was relatively peaceful and surprisingly the 
preliminary results indicated that the MDC-T was about to win both the House of 
Assembly election and the first round of the presidential election. This raised hopes among 
the opposition that Tsvangirai might win the first round of the presidential election with an 
outright majority, which would make him president without the need for a run-off. The 
ZANU-PF then refused to accept the preliminary results and demanded a recount. The 
official results were held back for more than a month by the ZEC, but when announced, 
they confirmed that the opposition had indeed won a majority of seats in the House of 
Assembly and Tsvangirai had won the first round of the presidential election, although 
lacking the outright majority.   
Losing the majority in the House of Assembly was a major blow to the ZANU-PF which 
now could not appoint a successor to Mugabe without facing new elections. The ZANU-PF 
was also in danger of losing the presidential run-off should Tsvangirai manage to maintain 
his lead. Conventional election tactics clearly had failed to bring ZANU-PF the electoral 
victory it needed. There are strong indications that Tsvangirai indeed won a narrow 
outright majority in the 29 March polls, which led Mugabe to order the ZEC to withhold 
the results so that the ZANU-PF leadership would have time to consider their next move 
(ICG 2008b: 3). One of the possible strategies was to rig the results enough to deny 
Tsvangirai an outright majority and fight for a run-off. Another strategy was to negotiate a 
power-sharing deal with the MDC and concede the presidential race to Tsvangirai. While 
some members of the ZANU-PF politburo where willing to accept the latter strategy, many 
of the hardliners, particularly within the Joint Operation Command (JOC), preferred the 
former and persuaded Mugabe to hold onto power while they would unleash an 
unprecedented campaign of violence and intimidation against the opposition activists, 
polling agents, perceived MDC supporters and “sell-outs”, in order to secure Mugabe’s re-
election in the run-off (ICG 2008b: 4–5).  
The crackdown turned out to be so brutal that it led to the withdrawal of Tsvangirai from 
the presidential race just few days before the ballot. According to the Human Rights Watch 
(2008b: 1), at least 36 people were killed and thousands were beaten between 29 March 
and 28 June 2008, when the second round ballot took place. Much of the violence was 
carried out by the “war-veterans” and the youth militia, and was concentrated particularly 
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on the rural areas that were traditionally considered to be ZANU-PF strongholds, but were 
now perceived to be showing increasing support to the opposition. 
6.3 KEY FINDINGS 
In general, Zimbabwe has long been seen as one of the most undemocratic countries in 
Africa. Having an autocratic ruler that is backed by the state security apparatus and that is 
unwilling to step down or give away political power to the opposition even in the face of a 
popular vote, is hardly an easy basis for a democratization process. Yet there are many 
positive features in the Zimbabwean political landscape in terms of prospects for genuine 
democratization. Firstly, despite the uneven field, many of the recent elections and 
referendums in Zimbabwe have shown relatively little indications of election fraud. 
Although the ZANU-PF has dominated the political contest through various conventional 
and illicit tactics, such as media control and political intimidation, it has also suffered some 
political setbacks in the polls, showing that although autocratic, Mugabe’s regime cannot 
always dictate the electoral outcomes in Zimbabwe. Secondly, the opposition has grown 
stronger—despite some internal disputes—and passed the ruling party in popularity. 
According to the Afrobarometer data from 2005, more than 62 percent of the Zimbabwean 
respondents affiliated with the MDC, as opposed to the 37.5 percent who affiliated with the 
ruling party, the ZANU-PF (Afrobarometer 2012). In 2009 more than 80 percent of the 
respondents affiliated with the MDC. Most importantly, the democratic demand among 
Zimbabweans has remained strong throughout the 2000s, despite the fact that the perceived 
supply of democracy has remained low. The Zimbabweans also have a fairly high level of 
trust in their fellow citizens: 55.3 percent of the Afrobarometer respondents19 in 2009 said 
they trust other Zimbabweans “somewhat” or “a lot”. As Dahl (1971) argues, a high level 
of mutual trust within the society favors democratization. The clearest difference in voting 
behavior came with the “age” and “locality” (urban/rural) divide, as older people (50+) in 
rural areas tend to vote more for the ZANU-PF and the young and the urban people tend to 
vote more for the MDC. 
                                                             
19
 By comparison, 40.2 percent of the Kenyans and only 30.3 percent of the Nigerians trusted their fellow 
citizens. 
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The economic turmoil in Zimbabwe, on-going since the 1990s, has taken a heavy toll on 
the ZANU-PF’s popularity and benefited the opposition considerably. While Mugabe has 
done his best to lay the blame for the economic crisis on the “malicious” sanctions by the 
West (the EU, the US, etc.), the Afrobarometer data from the years 1999, 2005 and 2009 
show a relatively constant 72 to 76 percent disapproval rate among Zimbabweans towards 
the performance of the President. An interesting exception to this trend was the year 2004, 
when more than two-thirds of the respondents approved of the way Mugabe had performed 
as president during the past twelve months. As Mugabe’s popularity started to decline in 
the late 1990s, he needed to compensate for the diminishing popular support by finding a 
new support base, which consisted of fellow war-veterans. In exchange for addressing their 
grievances on small pensions and the lack of land, Mugabe was able to mobilize the war-
veterans (and associated men from the younger generation) for anti-opposition political 
intimidation. Didmus Dewa (2009) from the Midlands State University of Zimbabwe 
argues that also the economic sanctions imposed by the Western powers on Zimbabwe and 
the track record of the Mugabe regime changed the voting behavior in the country 
considerably in favor of the MDC-T—not because the MDC-T was considered a better 
party than the ZANU-PF, but simply because people were fed up with the economic 
hardships and the MDC-T was considered the main alternative to the incumbent regime 
and that their coming to power was hoped to bring to an end the external economic 
sanctions imposed by the West (Dewa 2009: 491–492).   
The intimidation tactics, in addition to a strict media control, were fairly effective in 
securing the incumbents a sufficient advantage to win the elections up until 2008 when the 
MDC finally managed to out-compete the ZANU-PF, despite the disadvantaged position of 
the opposition party. The beating of several prominent MDC politicians in 2007 that 
prompted the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to send Thabo Mbeki to 
facilitate inter-party talks between the ZANU-PF and the MDC may have been a turning 
point as far as the MDC’s prospects for winning the upcoming elections were concerned. 
Although criticized of being too friendly with Robert Mugabe, Mbeki’s facilitation brought 
some small reforms to the legislation, including the new Electoral Act, which may have 
proved significant for the MDC’s success in the elections. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF were 
clearly more convinced that the piecemeal reforms would benefit the incumbent more than 
they would benefit the opposition. The most substantial reform discussed and agreed upon 
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in the inter-party talks—namely the constitutional reform—was deliberately left 
unimplemented by Mugabe before the elections, against the promises made by Mbeki to 
the MDC. Dewa (2009) points out that the new Electoral Acts allowed the opposition to 
use the public media for the first time in their election campaigns and also to access areas 
in Zimbabwe where opposition political activity during elections was previously prohibited 
or restricted (Dewa 2009: 492).  
Mugabe knew that as long as he enjoyed the full support of the Joint Operation Command, 
there was no fear of him being forced to give up the presidency against his will, regardless 
of the electoral outcome. It is very likely that Mugabe genuinely believed that he still had 
(or at least deserved) the popular support of the majority of Zimbabweans and would be 
once again be re-elected as president in 2008. A defeat in the first round was clearly 
unexpected, as suggested by the fact that the ZEC had to withhold the result for almost a 
month before Mugabe and the ZANU-PF could decide on their next move. A logical step 
would have been to forge the first round results to show a narrow victory for the 
incumbent, but apparently the ZEC refused to manipulate the results in a way that would 
Figure 4: Democratic demand in Zimbabwe (Afrobarometer 2009c: 4) 
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have seriously undermined its credibility given that—due to the new Electoral Act—the 
ballots were already counted at the polling stations, with the results posted publicly outside 
(ICG 2008b: 2). When there was no way for Mugabe to avoid a run-off, and it began to 
look apparent that he might lose if there was no change in tactics, the JOC effectively took 
over Mugabe’s run-off campaign and unleashed a violent Operation Makavhoterapapi?20 
in order to coerce people to vote “the right way” in the second round (HRW 2008b: 14; 
Kebonang 2012: 14). Kebonang argues that the JOC members’ main motive for the 
launching of a violent campaign in order to keep Mugabe in power was “self-
preservation”, as they were safeguarding their own impunity with respect to past atrocities 
they had committed under Mugabe’s regime (Kebonang 2012: 14). 
 The Afrobarometer data indicates that those Zimbabweans who reportedly voted for the 
MDC in the previous elections tended to perceive the development of the country’s 
economic conditions over the past 12 months more negatively than those who voted for the 
ZANU-PF. Likewise, in 2004, when Mugabe’s performance as president was rated 
positively by more than two-thirds of the respondents, a majority also perceived the 
                                                             
20 Operation “Where Did You Put Your Vote?” 
Figure 5: Democratic supply in Zimbabwe (Afrobarometer 2009c: 9) 
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economic conditions of the country to be improving over the past 12 months. Most 
notably, the tension between the popular democratic aspirations and the autocratic attempts 
to retain power can be seen in the perceived “democratic deficit”—i.e. the difference 
between democratic supply and demand—that can be seen in the Afrobarometer data from 
Zimbabwe prior to and after the 2008 elections. We can see that in 2005 the demand for 
democracy was on the rise, while the patience of the people and their satisfaction with the 
political system were decreasing. The establishment of a government of national unity 
(GNU) after the 2008 elections has clearly restored the patience towards the system, but 
the uneasy relationship between the rival parties which now form the government coalition 
reflects the inability of the GNU to produce any major results and thus contributes to a 
continued dissatisfaction towards the political system and results in a slight decrease in 
some of the indicators for democratic demand. 
6.4 DISCUSSION AND REMARKS 
A high democratic demand together with a low perceived democratic supply and a general 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent government are probably some of 
the key underlying factors that contributed to the increasing tension in the run-up and the 
aftermath of the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe. As Dahl (1971) argues, the democratic 
beliefs and a desire for change are crucial ingredients for democratization in non-
democratic regimes. But when the democratic pressure towards the incumbent grows 
beyond a certain point, the incumbent is likely to react in one of two ways: either through 
concessions or by increased oppression (Lindberg 2009a). The internal splits within both 
the opposition (MDC-Tsvangirai vs. MDC-Mutambara) and the incumbent (Robert 
Mugabe vs. Simba Makoni) have also played a major role in shaping the prospects and the 
expectations in the run-up to the elections. 
Looking at the potential costs and benefits related to the two main strategies available to 
the incumbent—namely the toleration versus the oppression—the benefit of toleration in 
the face of a looming defeat in either the first or the second round of the presidential 
election, there might have been a chance to negotiate a transitional period somewhat 
similar to the current power-sharing arrangement where a government of national unity 
would have been formed without the need for a violent crackdown during the run-off phase 
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of the elections. Then again, it may be unlikely that the MDC-T would have settled for a 
GNU if they were officially recognized as the winner of both the House of Assembly and 
the presidential elections. Thus the minimum cost of toleration would most likely have 
been the loss of presidency, which Robert Mugabe clearly was not ready to accept. In a 
worst case scenario (from Mugabe’s perspective), he would have probably been placed on 
trial, should he have given up his incumbency. As for the costs and the benefits of 
oppression—violence has never been an issue for Mugabe. He has even joked that he has a 
degree in violence. The JOC was more than willing to fight for his cause and even to take 
over in a coup, should the intimidation campaign fail (ICG 2008b: 4). The cost of 
oppression was most likely going to be continued external sanctions and a decrease in 
popular support, but Mugabe could always try to bargain with the opposition and make 
some moderate concessions to mitigate the sanctions, or even agree to a power-sharing 
deal on more favorable terms than might have been possible should he have admitted his 
defeat after the first round of the elections.  
The way the incumbent regime resorted to repression in Zimbabwe seems to comply with 
Collier & Vincente’s (2012) model of illicit tactics used by autocratic rulers in electoral 
authoritarian regimes where repression becomes a primary strategy for an incumbent with 
a large base of hardcore supporters in a situation where neither vote buying nor election 
fraud is a viable option (Collier & Vincente 2012: 137–138). The refusal by the ZEC to 
overtly manipulate the election results rendered election fraud out of question, and with an 
unprecedented hyperinflation and an economic turmoil going on in Zimbabwe during the 
elections, vote buying was not likely to work either. Thus, intimidation and violence 
seemed to be the only viable options for Mugabe to retain power even after the second 
round of the elections.  
Despite a deeply flawed run-off phase in the presidential election of 2008, I would argue 
that the prospects for a democratic transition in Zimbabwe look much better now than they 
did prior to the 2008 elections. The power-sharing deal with the MDC has provided the 
ZANU-PF a softer landing into competitive multi-party politics, in which they eventually 
must be prepared to face the prospect of losing the incumbency. Although many prominent 
members within the ZANU-PF may be ready to enter their party in a genuinely democratic 
contest, it is still unclear whether Robert Mugabe himself is willing to step down from the 
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presidential seat any time soon or whether the heads of the state security services will 
desist from politics in the future. 
7 CASE COMPARISON 
Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe each represent a prominent African state within its 
respective region. Apart from being formal British colonies, they share relatively few 
cultural, historical or demographic features beyond that which is typical to most Sub-
Saharan African countries, such as vast ethnic diversity21 and a largely rural but rapidly 
urbanizing population. Yet, within a relatively short time frame they have all faced major 
electoral problems including wide-scale electoral violence. In this chapter I will compare 
the three case countries and present some remarks on their differences and similarities. 
As noted in chapter 1, electoral violence can occur before, after, or during the voting 
period of the election. In the case of Nigeria, much of the violence occurred during the pre-
voting phase, but the official election day(s) and the post-election period were relatively 
peaceful. In Kenya, violence erupted almost immediately after the announcement of the 
election results, or in some places already before the announcement as the delay in the 
announcement generated rumors of a possible election fraud. Here again, the actual 
election day was relatively peaceful. In Zimbabwe, however, there was electoral violence 
present on some levels already during the pre-election phase, but a systematic campaign of 
violence and intimidation against opposition activists and perceived supporters started only 
after the announcement of the results of the first round (of the presidential election) and 
intensified towards the end of the run-off phase. 
It should be noted that in Nigeria, despite outgoing President Obasanjo’s statement of “do-
or-die” elections for the ruling party, much of the electoral violence was in fact intra-party 
violence that centered around the PDP primaries. It seems that personal and local level 
interests played a more central role as motivators for electoral violence than orders coming 
from the party’s top leadership. Because of the ruling party’s hegemonic position, the 
opposition parties were rarely able to challenge the PDP in the federal elections (namely 
                                                             
21
 Even here Zimbabwe marks an exception with a relatively homogenous ethnic population, including only 
two major ethnic groups, the Shona and the Ndebele. 
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the national parliamentary and the presidential elections), but on the local level the 
opposition candidates could sometimes compete with the PDP candidates on a more even 
ground, and they had the opportunity to use many of the same legal and illicit tactics as 
their PDP rivals.  
In Kenya, many of the perpetrators of electoral violence were hardcore supporters of the 
opposition, but apparently the intrinsic motivation for the violence, especially in the Rift 
Valley Province, had more to do with ethnicity and land rights than with partisan politics. 
The element of election fraud has been widely recognized as the main trigger of the post-
election mass protests, often leading to violent confrontations with the police. However, in 
some places the inability of the local police to control protests resulted in a collapse of 
state authority and created a state of lawlessness that enabled the perpetrators of electoral 
violence to act unchecked. Unlike in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the Kenyan police and 
military had no historical ties to the incumbent regime that had only come to power in 
2002. In Nigeria, the military has traditionally not been able to distinguish between “the 
ruling party” and “the government”, making it prone to a partisan bias during elections. In 
Zimbabwe, the security sector’s role in facilitating and orchestrating electoral violence was 
pivotal and not too surprising, given the open partisanship of many of the top people in the 
state security services (the police, the military and the prison service). 
One of the common features in all three cases is the diminishing popular support for the 
incumbent party in favor of its closest political rivals in the elections. In Nigeria, the PDP 
still retained its hegemonic position (at least according to the official election results) but 
was clearly less secure about its winning margin than in the previous elections. The 
Afrobarometer data shows a nearly 20 % decrease in popular support for the PDP (from 
54.5 percent to 34.6 percent) between 2005 and 2008. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the 
Afrobarometer data from 2008–2009 indicates a clear lead for the ODM and the MDC-T, 
respectively, over their political rivals: the ODM leads against the PNU with 52.9 percent 
to 20.8 percent, and the MDC-T leads against the ZANU-PF with 79.9 percent to 13.5 
percent. However, the most recent figures from the yet unpublished Afrobarometer round 5 
from 2012 indicates shrinking gap in popularity between the MDC-T and the ZANU-PF, 
predicting another close race in the 2012 elections, with a high risk for renewed electoral 
violence. (Afrobarometer 2012.) 
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Some other common features can be found in all three cases. From figure 6 we can see that 
Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe all suffered from a “democratic deficit”, meaning that the 
perceived demand for democracy is higher than the perceived supply. All three countries 
also have a previous history of election-related violence. In Kenya, almost every election 
since the early 1990s has been marred with electoral violence, albeit not in as large a scale 
as the 2008 elections. In Nigeria and Zimbabwe, electoral violence has also occurred in 
elections throughout the 2000s. 
Another common feature that has not been subject to much research among scholars of 
African electoral conflicts is the prevalence of internal splits within the incumbent and/or 
opposition parties shortly prior to elections. In both Nigeria and Zimbabwe, a prominent 
member of the ruling party challenged the official presidential candidate of the party by 
joining forces with an opposition party. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, also the opposition 
suffered from fragmentation, as the leaders of different factions of the opposition coalition 
Figure 6: Consolidation of political regimes (Beatton & Mattes 2009: 15) 
Consolidated autocrazy 
Consolidated democrazy 
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failed to agree on a single presidential candidate. The divisions among the incumbents and 
the opposition have often appeared to tighten the presidential race and may have 
contributed to the unwillingness of the rival party to admit defeat or give up the election 
struggle.    
There is generally a relatively low level of trust in the national electoral commission 
among the citizens in all of the three case countries. In Kenya, the trust in the electoral 
commission fell drastically after the 2007 elections, from 60.4 percent to only 25.4 percent. 
In Nigeria, the trust in the electoral commission was already extremely low at 21.6 percent 
and actually improved to 29.4 percent after the 2007 elections. In Zimbabwe, too, there 
was a slight improvement in the trust rate for the electoral commission from 30.7 percent 
to 33.8 percent, although the percentage of people not trusting the electoral commission at 
all increased from 36.7 to 48.0 percent. This mistrust in the national electoral commissions 
correlates with the public perception of the freeness and fairness of elections. In all three 
case countries, the majority of the population perceived the elections as “not free or fair” or 
as “having major problems”. Even the supporters of the ruling party in each country tended 
to have a critical view on the electoral conduct. In all of the three countries people 
generally felt they needed to be careful concerning what they might say about politics. In 
Zimbabwe, 85 percent of the people felt that they “often” or “always” need to be careful 
about what they could say. In Nigeria and in Kenya, respectively, the same was true for 
64.1 percent and 54.6 percent of the population.  
In terms of what has been the effect of unfair for popular democratic aspirations in Nigeria, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, the Afrobarometer shows mixed results. In Nigeria, the democratic 
deficit has largely remained the same, but both the perceived supply of and demand for 
democracy have decreased—indicating that the country would be sliding towards 
autocratization. In Zimbabwe, the perceived supply of democracy increased after the 2008 
elections compared to the situation in 2005, presumably due to the positive public reaction 
to the post-election power-sharing agreement that historically ended the long-standing one-
party rule in Zimbabwe, although leaving Mugabe on the president’s seat. However, at the 
same time the demand for democracy in Zimbabwe decreased.  
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In Kenya, despite a similar power-sharing agreement, the perceived supply of democracy, 
as measured by the level of satisfaction with the prevailing state of democracy, fell from 
62.7 percent to 45.4 percent, possibly due to the failed expectations generated by the 
encouraging advances in the democratic process that took place in Kenya in the early 
2000s, namely with the peaceful transition from the long-standing KANU rule to a 
government formed by the seemingly pro-democratic National Rainbow Coalition, and the 
successful “No” campaign in the 2005 constitutional referendum, both of which increased 
the people’s trust in the electoral/democratic process. The elections in 2007 marked a 
failure for the Kenyan democratic institutions, most notably the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya, which had previously been hailed as the vanguard of the democratic transition in 
Kenya.  
Lindberg’s theory of elections as a mode of transition, while extremely helpful in 
understanding the violent crackdown in Zimbabwe, has some trouble explaining many of 
the features in the other two cases examined in this thesis. Even though the incumbents in 
Consolidated democrazy 
Figure 7: Democratic decline of regimes in Africa (Bratton & Mattes 2009: 17) 
Consolidated autocrazy 
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Nigeria and Kenya certainly played a crucial role in the electoral processes that involved 
massive amounts of electoral violence, Lindberg’s theory fails to address the role of both 
the opposition and the local level politicians in orchestrating electoral violence. Here 
Collier & Vincente’s model of illicit electoral tactics becomes helpful in explaining how 
the availability of different electoral tactics (both conventional and illicit) and the strategy 
choices made by political rivals are likely to affect which election tactics will be used 
during the electoral process.  In Kenya, the incumbent resorted to election fraud rather than 
electoral violence in order to win the election, and the hardcore supporters of the 
opposition responded with violence, lacking the opportunity to resort to counter-fraud. In 
Nigeria’s gubernatorial elections, none of the competing parties often had access to 
election fraud, so the main illicit tactics at hand were electoral violence and vote buying. 
Yet, the theoretical models of neither Lindberg nor Collier & Vincente are particularly 
easy to match with the Afrobarometer data that has been the focal point of analysis in this 
thesis. In fact, the Afrobarometer data seems to match most closely with Robert A. Dahl’s 
(1971) notions of democratization, as it deals mainly with the public democratic 
aspirations, which Dahl has found crucial for democratization processes. Fortunately, the 
Afrobarometer is a very rich source of data, and the excellent user interface of the online 
data analysis tool (which is provided at the Afrobarometer website) makes it possible to 
analyze the data against the backdrop of many different kinds of theoretical models, 
including the ones provided by Lindberg and Collier & Vincente, although the theory and 
the data may not always make an ideal match.   
8 CONCLUSIONS 
In consolidated democracies, the electoral process is designed to be highly predictable, 
while the electoral outcome (the election results) is usually somewhat unpredictable. In 
electoral authoritarian regimes, the electoral outcome tends to be predictable—the 
incumbent stays in power—while the electoral process can be highly unpredictable, often 
involving varying degrees of vote buying, intimidation, violence and fraud so that the 
intended outcome can be achieved. From the point of view of democratization, elections 
that result in something other than a clear-cut victory for the incumbent are often the most 
interesting ones.  
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The focal point in this study has been to find out under what conditions are elections in 
Africa at high risk of being marred with electoral violence. Apart from being commonly 
associated with electoral authoritarian regimes, where the incumbent is not willing to give 
up power and is only using elections in an attempt to legitimize the existing regime, 
electoral violence is an illicit strategy that is actually readily available for both the 
incumbent and the opposition alike, and it is often used in situations in which conventional 
or other illicit election tactics, such as vote buying and election fraud, are deemed to be 
insufficient, too costly or too difficult to implement by the political contender. In Nigeria, 
electoral violence was orchestrated mainly by individual politicians on the local level, 
representing both the (national) ruling party and the opposition parties. The violence was 
often sponsored by “political god-fathers”, i.e. powerful individuals who feel a need to use 
their power to secure their own political interests and prefer not to get personally involved 
in local level politics. In Kenya, the main perpetrators of electoral violence were hardcore 
opposition supporters who unleashed the violence in response to the perceived election 
fraud by the incumbent.  
On the basis of the Afrobarometer data, it seems evident that the risk of electoral violence 
occurring is bound to increase in Africa’s electoral authoritarian regimes, when the 
popularity of the main opposition party (or a coalition of opposition parties) surpasses that 
of the ruling party, making it increasingly difficult for the incumbent party to win the next 
elections without large-scale voter/opponent intimidation or election fraud. A sufficiently 
independent and unbiased national electoral commission, supported by constitutional 
safeguards that prevent the incumbent from interfering in the vote counting process, is 
likely to prevent at least large-scale election fraud from taking place. The presence of 
national and international election observers is also likely to make it more difficult to 
attempt to carry out election fraud—or any illicit election strategy for that matter. 
However, the operability of the election observers is often severely restricted by the 
autocratic incumbent. When election fraud is not a viable strategy, electoral violence often 
becomes the strategy of choice. Zimbabwe is a prime example of a country in which a 
diminishing popular support forced the incumbent to resort to electoral violence, as 
election fraud was not a viable option. Also in Nigeria’s gubernatorial elections, election 
fraud was presumably more difficult to carry out than other illicit election tactics, and thus 
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it became less used option, whereas vote buying and electoral violence were widely 
adopted as the chosen election strategies.  
A high democratic demand coupled with a low perceived supply of democracy, which 
constitute to what I have called “democratic deficit”, is another potential indicator of a risk 
of electoral violence. In all three case countries democratic deficit is noticeably high. In 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the democratic deficit has remained high throughout the 2000s, 
whereas in Kenya democratic supply and demand were in balance in 2003, but the supply 
side has subsequently plummeted in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, evidently because of 
the failed elections. A high democratic demand may also hamper any potential vote buying 
attempts during elections, as high democratic demand is likely to produce a high sell-out 
price for the average citizens, something that politicians with limited economic resources 
may not be able to afford. 
Staffan Lindberg’s theory, in which elections are seen as a mode of transition in the 
political landscape, suggests that the costs of toleration might be the main reason why 
incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes resort to illicit election tactics and violence in 
their attempts to win elections. The costs of toleration often translate into high stakes in the 
elections. The higher the stakes, the more there is to win and to lose, and the more 
tempting illicit tactics become, if they are perceived as a potential way of securing a 
favorable electoral outcome. Sometimes the perceived cost of losing an election may 
simply be unacceptable to the incumbent. In Zimbabwe, electoral violence evidently took 
place because the costs of toleration outweighed the costs of oppression in the second 
round of the presidential election. In Kenya, however, it seems more plausible to presume 
that the costs of oppression (in this case the costs of an election fraud) were simply 
underestimated by the incumbent—demonstrating that the cost/benefit calculations of both 
oppression and toleration are always based on a subjective assessment and do not 
necessarily correspond to reality.  
In the case of Kenya, ethnic rivalries and land disputes were arguably significant 
underlying factors in the outbreak of violence in the Rift Valley Province. It serves as an 
example of how unresolved social/ethnic grievances may catalyze a violent social reaction 
towards electoral malpractices. In Zimbabwe, according to the Afrobarometer data, 
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ethnicity did not play a major role in party affiliation, and surprisingly even the urban–
rural divide that traditionally had produced strong rural support for the incumbent ZANU-
PF now placed the opposition MDC-T in a clear lead in popularity across the board—both 
in urban and rural areas.   
The three cases that were examined in this study share two features that are likely to result 
in volatile elections in non-consolidated democracies, but in order for us to be able to 
assess their significance in this respect, further research is still needed. These two features 
are: (1) an indecisive constitutional reform and (2) internal splits within the incumbent 
and/or the main opposition party during the run-up to the elections. Both of these are likely 
to alter the stakes and the odds in upcoming elections, potentially increasing both 
dissatisfaction and uncertainty, which may be reflected in what choices the political 
contenders make as far as their election strategies are concerned. In Nigeria, the then Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar effectively blocked the incumbent President Obasanjo’s 
constitutional reform that would have allowed him to run for a third term. Subsequently 
Abubakar was forced to split from the ruling party, and he decided to run for president in 
the ranks of the opposition. In Kenya, the watered-down constitutional reform was 
successfully rejected by the opposition in a constitutional referendum, but the opposition 
coalition subsequently failed to agree on a single presidential candidate for the 2007 
elections, causing the ODM to split into two separate fractions, while another member of 
the opposition coalition, namely the former ruling party KANU, joined forces with the 
incumbent party. In Zimbabwe, a constitutional reform was agreed upon in the inter-party 
talks between the ZANU-PF and the MDC, but Mugabe refused to implement the new 
constitution prior to the elections. Much like in Kenya, the two MDC factions failed to 
agree on a single presidential candidate, causing the smaller faction to join forces with the 
ZANU-PF renegade Simba Makoni in the presidential election of 2008.  
As for the effects of unfair and violent elections on popular democratic aspirations in 
Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe, it seems apparent that democratic demand continues to 
remain high in these countries despite violent and unfair elections. At the same time, the 
popularity of the main opposition parties has been constantly rising, as compared against 
that of the incumbents, making a regime change—if not imminent, then at least—highly 
plausible in the near future. Yet it still remains to be seen how the power-sharing deals in 
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Kenya and Zimbabwe will affect the popularity of the former opposition parties that now 
share the government responsibility with their main political rivals.  
REFERENCES 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
African Elections Database 2012. URL: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ (visited on June 
1, 2012)  
Afrobarometer  
2012. Online Data Analysis. URL: 
http://www.jdsurvey.net/afro/afrobarometer.jsp (visited on Aug. 7, 2012) 
2009a. Popular Attitudes toward Democracy in Nigeria: A Summary of 
Afrobarometer Indicators, 2000-2008. Afrobarometer. 
2009b. Summary of Results: Round 3.5 Afrobarometer Survey in Nigeria (2007). 
Afrobarometer. 
2009c. Popular Attitudes towards Democracy in Zimbabwe: A Summary of 
Afrobarometer Indicators, 1999–2009. Afrobarometer. 
ECK 2007. Provincial Presidential Votes Analysis — Presidential Elections Results 2007. 
Office of Government Spokesperson. URL: 
http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/province.asp (visited on Sept. 14, 
2012) 
HRW 
2007a. Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria. 
Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 19, No. 16(A). 
2007b. Election or “Selection”? Human Rights Abuse and Threats to Free and 
Fair Elections in Nigeria. Human Rights Watch Report. 
 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA                       81 
 
 
2008a. Ballots to Bullets. Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of 
Governance. Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 20, No. 1(A).  
2008b. Bullets for Each of You. State Sponsored Violence Since Zimbabwe’s 
March 29 Elections. Human Rights Watch Report.  
Hyde, Susan D & Nikolay Marinov 2012. National Elections Across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA). 
ICG  
2007a. Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State? International Crisis Group, 
Africa Report No. 126. 
2007b. Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis. International Crisis 
Group, Africa Report No. 123. 
2008a. Kenya in Crisis. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 137. 
2008b. Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition. International Crisis Group, Policy 
Briefing No. 51. 
2008c. Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election. International Crisis Group, 
Africa Report No. 138. 
CIPEV 2008. Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) Final 
Report. Office of Public Communications: Nairobi. URL: 
http://www.communication.go.ke/Documents/CIPEV_FINAL_REPORT.pdf 
(Visited on 13.9.2012) 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Albert, Isaac O. 2007. Reconceptualising electoral violence in Nigeria. In Albert, I.O., D. 
Marco & V. Adetula (Eds.). Perspectives on the 2003 elections in Nigeria. 
IDASA and Sterling-Holding Publishers: Abuja. 
Atoubi, Samuel M. 2008. Election-Related Violence in Africa. In Conflict Trends 2008/1. 
ACCORD. 
 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA                       82 
 
 
Badza, Simon 2008. Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and Their Implications for Africa. In 
African Security Review, Vol. 17, No. 4. Institute for Security Studies.  
Bratton, Michael & Robert Mattes 2009. Neither Consolidating Nor Fully Democratic: 
The Evolution of African Political Regimes, 1999–2008. Afrobarometer Briefing 
Paper No. 67. 
Bratton, Michael & Nicolas van de Walle 1992. Popular Protest and Political Reform in 
Africa. In Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 419–442. 
Collier, Paul & Pedro C. Vincente  
2012. Violence, Bribery, and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In Public Choice, Vol. 153, No. 1–2, pp. 117–147. Springer 
Link, (electronic version). 
2011. Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria. Working 
Paper: http://www.pedrovicente.org/violence.pdf (visited Aug. 7, 2012) 
Cyllah, Almami I. 2010. Democracy and Elections in Africa: Recent Trends and the Role 
of the International Community. Testimony before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health. IFES. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press: 
New Haven and London. 
Davies, James C. 1969. The J-Curve of rising and declining satisfactions as a cause of 
some great revolutions and a contained rebellion. In  Hugh Davis Graham and Ted 
Robbert Gurr (Eds.), The History of Violence in America. Bantam: New York. 
Dercon, Stefan & Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero 2012. Triggers and Characteristics of the 
2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence. In World Development, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 731–
744.  
Dewa, Didmus 2009. Factors Affecting Voting Behavior and Voting Patterns in 
Zimbabwe’s 2008 Harmonized Elections. In African Journal of Political Science 
and International Relations. Vol. 3, No 11, pp. 490–496. 
 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA                       83 
 
 
Fischer, Jeff 2002. Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention. 
IFES White Paper.  
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman and London 
Hyde, Susan D. & Nikolay Marinov 2012. Which Elections Can Be Lost? In Political 
Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 191–210. Oxford University Press. 
Höglund, Kristine 2010. Leaders, Violence and Political Power: Exploring Linkages 
between Political Leadership and Electoral Violence. Paper prepared for the ISA 
Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 2010. 
Kanyinga, Karuti 2009. The Legacy of White Highlands: Land-rights, Ethnicity, and the 
Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya. In Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 325–344. Routledge. 
Kasara, Kimuli 2009. Electoral Geography and Conflict in Kenya: Examining the Local-
level Causes of Violence in Rift Valley Province After the 2007 Elections. 
University of Columbia. 
Kebonang, Zein 2012. Politics and Anarchy: Zimbabwe’s 2008 Run-off Presidential 
Elections in Context. In African Journal of History and Culture, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 
9–16. 
Lindberg, Staffan I.  
2009a. A Theory of Elections as a Mode of Transition. In Staffan I. Lindberg (ed.) 
Democratization by Elections: A New mode of Transition, pp. 314–341. 
Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 
2009b. Democratization by Elections? A Mixed Record. In Journal of Democracy 
Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 86–92. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 
2007. Power of Elections Revisited. Paper presented at the conference, Elections 
and Political Identities in New Democracies, Yale University, April 28-29, 
2007. 
 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA                       84 
 
 
Morse, Yonatan L.2012. Review article: The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism. In World 
Politics Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 161-198. Cambridge University Press. 
Muller, Susan D. 2011. Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional 
Decay in Kenya. In Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 
99–117. Routledge. 
Onslow, Sue 2011. Zimbabwe and Political Transition. Strategic Update. London School 
of Economics and Political Science.  
Pambazuka News 2007. Nigerian after the April 2007 elections: What next? URL: 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/42250 (visited on June 8, 2012) 
Rakner, Lise & Nicolas van de Walle 2009. Democratization by Elections? Opposition 
Weakness in Africa. In Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 108–121. Johns 
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore.  
Sachikonye, Lloyd 2009. Between Authoritarianism and Democratization: The Challenge 
of a Transition Process in Zimbabwe. Occasional Paper, No. 2. Dipartimento di 
Politica, Istituzioni, Storia – Universitá di Bologna.  
Schedler, Andreas  
2010a. Transitions from Electoral Authoritarianism. Working Paper, No. 222. 
CIDE. 
2010b. Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense. In Journal of Democracy Vol. 
21, No 1. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 
